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This study examines the televised political image- 
making of Louis Lambert during his unsuccessful 1979 
Louisiana gubernatorial campaign. During the campaign, 
over $20 million was spent by the six major candidates 
for the office of governor. Lambert spent approximately 
$3.5 million, with the majority of his money being spent 
on televised advertisements.
The study includes an overview of Lambert's campaign, 
followed by an analysis of his campaign. The three dif­
ferent phases of the campaign and the three media con­
sultants Lambert employed is analyzed. The study also 
examines the verbal and non-verbal aspects of Lambert’s 
political commercials.
The study revealed that political image-making is 
an important factor in a campaign. Moreover, the nega­
tive image a candidate projects can possibly have worse 
effect on an individual's candidacy than a positive image. 
The study also contends that additional aspects of po­
litical communication, such as campaign organization, 
direct-mail, phone banks, polling, and campaign strategy, 





Since the early 1950's there has been a proliferation
1in the use of television by candidates for public office. 
More and more the politician is becoming dependent on TV as 
the principal medium for presenting his platform and, equal­
ly important, his image, to the electorate.
As to the latter, television in political campaigns 
frequently raises the argument that the focus has shifted 
from issues to image. To analyze this argument properly, 
one needs to reflect on pre-television days, when issues 
were supposedly the main focus.
Emmett J. Hughes claims that image has always been an 
important criterion. "Personality has always mattered 
critically in politics - back through the age of radio to 
the street-corner rally and the doorbell-ringing campaigns." 
Dan Hahn contends that "the focus has always been upon im­
age, or upon image as a manifestation of the issues ... When 
a voter cast his ballot for "The Great Commoner," he was 
voting for image-plus, he was voting for a whole series of 
issues which were somehow tied in with the image ... When 
a person cast a vote in 1960 for the "mature" Nixon or the
"vigorous" Kennedy, he was voting for an image intimately
3connected with the issue of leadership."
1
2
A candidate's use of image is a part of his type of 
persuasion. Political consultants attempt to build a de­
sirable impression of their candidates. The vote-winning 
capacity of a particular candidate’s image centers on 
those qualities which he or she believes will constitute 
a desirable impression, and the ability to convince voters 
that the candidate has those qualities.
Political researchers who have analyzed the literature 
concerning opinion polls and surveys find that the candi­
date ' s experience is the most important characteristic, 
with integrity, honesty, education, and intelligence fol­
lowing. Also listed as significant qualities are indepen­
dence, leadership, administrative ability, aggressiveness,
youth, attractive personality, sincerity, and "a stable 
4family life."
The 1950's marked the beginning of the television com-
5mercial's ability to shape a candidate's image. Dwight D. 
Eisenhower is considered the first television candidate 
because of his image as portrayed through that medium. 
Television's influence in image-making was also evident in 
the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon presidential campaign.
The dominant feature in that campaign was the candi­
date 's series of debates. Their colloquies provided re­
searchers the opportunity to test television's effective­
ness in presenting a candidate. In one such study, by 
Elihu Katz and Jacob J. Feldman, the researchers concluded
3
that viewers did not get sufficient information from the 
debates to cause them to change their choice. However, 
viewers had "learned something about the candidates them­
selves. They discovered how well each candidate could
gperform in a debate, and the images of each candidate."
Television commercials are only one of many stimuli 
acting on the voter, but apparently they are one of the 
strongest influences on the voter's decision. The candidate 
is no longer a man alone, but rather a member of a group 
organized to accomplish the task of communicating. An im­
portant member of that group is the media consultant whose 
function is to communicate the image of the candidate to 
the voter through the medium of advertising.
METHOD
This is a descriptive analetic study regarding the 
televised commercials aired during Louis Lambert's 1979 
gubernatorial campaign. This does not purport to be an 
experimental study. Data were gathered through inter­
views and from literature on the topic. Since the in­
terviews were with media consultants, people involved with 
a particular campaign, and politically astute individuals, 
the study borders on field research. Interviews were con­
ducted with political media consultants James Carvin of 
New Orleans, Louisiana and Raymond Strother of Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana, and Roger Ailes of New York, New York; with 
Lambert's campaign manager, Frank Brown and his campaign
4
director, Gary O'Neill; with Wayne Davis, media director 
for Gillis Long's 1971 gubernatorial campaign, with Nancy 
Todd, secretary for Matt Reese and Associates of Washing­
ton, D. C.; with long-time political consultant Edmond 
Reggie of Crowley, Louisiana; with polling expert Jim 
Lloyd of Lance Terrance and Associates of Dallas, Texas; 
and with political researcher and writer James Gray of 
Washington, D. C.
In the concluding chapter, the writer makes impres­
sionistic observations concerning the effectiveness of 
image-making in Lambert's campaign. The conclusions 
drawn are based primarily from the information gained 
through the interviews and past research in the area of 
political image-making. The writer's judgments and 
opinions are simple observations of the political com­
mercials .
The specific purpose of the study is to analyze the 
image-making techniques of televised political commercials 
used in Louis Lambert's 1979 gubernatorial campaign.
The potential exists for television news coverage, or
"free" media, to have a significant impact on a candidate's
image. News reporting may either contradict or enhance
an image the candidate is attempting to project through his
political advertisement, and the news media can certainly
7influence voters. Gerald Ford's 1976 presidential campaign, 
for example, underscores this point. His stumbling while 
leaving an airplane was reported as a clumsy action, creat-
5
ing a contradiction to the image Ford had been trying to
establish. His stumbling was in sharp contrast to his
cultivated image as a distinguished and gracious leader.
Hofstetter and Buss remind us that news reporting 
8may also be biased. They state that bias in reporting
may consist of outright lying, distortion, aggregating
and diffusing certain facts but not others, or disagree-
9ment over basic values or beliefs. A significant polit­
ical characteristic of television is its power to estab­
lish an image of an individual. Since researchers gen­
erally agree that TV can promote a certain image of a 
10candidate, news reporting can also affect the image the 
electorate has of the candidate. Due to the differences 
in structure and intended purposes of political advertising 
and news reporting and to the vast scope of the latter, 
the respective contributions of these two forms of polit­
ical communication can not feasibly be analyzed in the 
same study. Thus, the present study is limited in scope 
to the analysis of the political advertisements during 
Lambert1s campaign.
Lambert's campaign did not follow a pre-planned 
media strategy as to viewer targeting. Consequently, the 
Lambert organization apparently kept no record of their 
media time purchases. Also, attempts to obtain this in­
formation from broadcasting stations throughout the state 
proved unsuccessful. For the purpose of this study, the
6
potential audience viewing Lambert's advertisements will 
be defined as the registered voters in Louisiana in 1979. 
According to the census data in 1979, of the voting-age
11population, 1.9 million or 70%, were registered to vote. 
Therefore, the potential viewing audience is the 1.9 million 
registered Louisiana voters during 1979.
A political commercial is a message that is aired in 
a time period purchased by a candidate. The commercial is 
frequently limited in time to 10, 20, 30 or 60 seconds. The 
concentration here is on 30 and 60 second commercials, since 
these were the prime basic units used by each media consul­
tant. The study focuses on the verbal and non-verbal mes­
sages and the images communicated to the Louisiana electorate.
Chapter II includes a review of literature on the 
topic of political image-making. The literature includes 
texts on the subject matter, interviews with professionals 
in the area of image-making, journal articles, and news­
papers. This chapter also focuses on political research.
Chapter III includes an overview of the entire cam­
paign. This chapter also includes an historical sketch of 
Louis Lambert - his background, his past political involve­
ment and his reasons for seeking the office of governor.
Lambert recognized the important role his media con­
sultants would play in the campaign. However, during the 
course of the campaign, Lambert was forced to employ three 
different consultants. Each consultant was instrumental 
in shaping a new image of Lambert. It therefore seems
7
important that the work of each consultant is analyzed.
A brief description of the consulting firms is provid­
ed in order to better understand the personalities behind 
the image makers. This chapter includes a descriptive an­
alysis of Lambert's paid political advertisements and the 
effectiveness of these advertisements. Finally, attention 
is given to the reasons for the dismissal of the consultants.
Chapter IV also provides an overview of the primary 
election results* An analysis of the court battle that 
followed the primary election and the four Democrat can­
didates who endorsed the Republican candidate is included. 
This examination reveals the severe problems the Lambert 
campaign encountered prior to the general election. The 
Chapter also examines the third consulting firm involved in 
the campaign and the reasons for hiring this firm.
Chapter V is a content analysis of the verbal and 
non-verbal aspect of the political commercials. The var­
ious aesthetic techniques employed by the media consultants 
are analyzed.
Chapter VI is the conclusion of the study and includes 
an overall analysis of Lambert's campaign for governor. 
Attention will be given to the strengths and weaknesses of 
his organization and his campaign. This chapter provides 
a final examination of the effectiveness of the numerous 
television advertisements on the images which were being 
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
It is necessary to review several bodies of literature 
in order to place the present work properly within the 
existing body of knowledge.
This review is highly selective and is not intended 
to be a comprehensive coverage of selected areas. The re­
view is intended to provide a basis- for the development of 
this study of political image-making.
Great men, even during their life­
time, are usually known to the public 
only through a fictitious personality.
Hence the modicum of truth in the old 
saying that no man is a hero to his 
valet. There is only a modicum of 
truth, for the valet, and the private 
secretary, are often immersed in the 
fiction themselves. Royal personages 
are, of course, constructed personal­
ities. Whether they themselves be­
lieve in their character, or whether 
they merely permit the chamberlain 
to stage - manaae it, there are at 
least two distinct selves, the public 
and the regal self, the private and 
human. 1
2Images, "the pictures in our heads," are of increased
concern in the study of political communication. An image
is an individual's cognitive attribute. It may be a mem-
3ory, a belief, an opinion or an attitude. Moreover, an 
image is "a subjective representation of something pre-
4viously perceived," ' the "conception of qualities that 
people associate with certain objects, products, or indi­
viduals." ^ In a word, images are mental pictures which
9
10
people use the better to comprehend the world around them.
These mental pictures are, in turn, shaped and provoked by
6our personal attitudes and feelings.
It seems as though we are living in a world where the
image is of more importance than the original, which has
itself become the original.... The shadow has become the 
7substance." In past political elections, the politician's 
ideals have frequently been displaced by images. The im­
age, writes David Boorstin, "is a pseudo-image ... it is 
synthetic, believable, passive, vivid, simplified, and
gambiguous." For the purpose of this study, an "image" is 
the mental pictures the electorate has of the political 
candidate.
The political actions of individuals seem to be "found­
ed by the images of political reality ... which we carry
9around with us." Moreover, individuals seem to treat im­
ages like the environment itself. Their actions appear to 
be governed by "an image of the present in which the act oc­
curs, an image of the past preceding the act, and an image
10of the future subsequent to the act.
Individuals involved in the political arena should al­
so focus attention on image. Kenneth Boulding noted that a 
candidate's image consists of the subjective impressions 
that the voters have of him. "These impressions can be of 
any type - thoughts about a candidate's values and campaign
successes are as much a part of his image as are ideas about
.11his personality and leadership."
11
Stephen Shadegg, a special consultant and active mem­
ber of the Republican National Committee, advanced this 
concept of a candidate's image: "The image of a candidate 
is the public appreciation of the candidate's personality, 
philosophy, intelligence, competence, and performance
record. The image is what the public sees, knows, and be-
12lieves about the candidate." However, political images 
are a complicated combination of information and evaluation 
and are often difficult to separate.
When an individual views a televised advertisement, he 
may have a different impression of a candidate. An individ­
ual's impression of a candidate can be either stylistic or 
13political. Stylistic impressions are associated with the 
candidate's mannerisms and campaign performances. This in­
cludes such factors as the candidate's personality, campaign 
success and style, and personal background. Conversely, po­
litical impressions are concerned with the candidate’s govern-
14ing actions and capacities such as his issue position.
An example illustrating the difference between stylist­
ic and political impressions is the Gerald Ford-Jimmy Carter 
1976 presidential campaign. Ford's image was primarily po­
litical, as the electorate's impressions focused on his pres­
idential tenure, leadership, and political actions. During 
the campaign, however, these impressions were downplayed, 
while stylistic impressions, such as his personality, were 
emphasized.
Carter's impression focused on the stylistic, rather
12
than the political. His personality, reflecting his back­
ground, was a positive factor that aided him throughout 
the campaign.
A candidate's image will not be significantly changed
by new information, once the image has been developed.
"The developed image will limit the impact of subsequent
15news about the candidate."
IMAGE RESEARCH AMD POLITICAL POLLS
According to nationally prominent political advertiser
Douglas L. Bailey, "political campaigns these days live
16with polls, maybe too many polls." The winning candidate 
is usually the one who most effectively responds to the con­
cerns of his constituency. Therefore, it seems the most ef­
fective means of learning their concerns is through opinion 
research.
In developing campaign strategy, the candidate's re­
search staff must consider both issues and image. In 1978,
research revealed that voters best remembered the issues
17from past campaigns. Prior to the election, however, image
was more important than issues in shaping voter attitude.
When speaking on an issue, the candidate should use that
issue as a means to portray the intended image to the 
18voters.
Political polls and opinion surveys, if properly con­
ducted and analyzed, can be effective tools for giving
the candidate reliable information as to what is going on
19in the minds of the voters. As political pollster Lance
13
Terrance points out, most surveys provide answers to such
pertinent questions as: What are the key issues in the
election? How many voters know of the candidate? Of this
number, is their opinion good, bad or indifferent? If
they like, or dislike the candidate, why? What is their
opinion of the other candidates? If the election were
today, how would it come out? Where do the voters get
20most of their political information? ' All such questions
provide the pollster with information useful in planning
the campaign strategy.
Various methods of sampling are available to the
pollsters. Two common types are "probability” and "quota" 
21sampling. Probability sampling assumes that the individ­
uals selected for interview are representative of the en­
tire population within the candidate's geographical re­
gions .
Population quota sampling involves the analysis of 
census data to identify the distribution by such charac­
teristics as age, sex, income and education. Quota sam­
pling also enables the pollster to achieve equal repre-
22sentation of the designed population.
The information gathering process begins once the
subjects for survey are selected. Questions put to the
respondents can be either open-ended or close-ended and ■
can be presented to the respondent by mail, by telephone 
23or in person.
Survey research involves various stages. First, the
14
project preparation should include several considerations, 
such as hypothesizing (deciding what will be studied), 
designing (establishing procedures and methods to be used), 
planning (determining materials and personnel needs), and 
financing (arranging support for the survey). Second, the 
sample selection technique is determined for choosing those 
people to be interviewed. Third, the questionnaire must 
be prepared. Questionnaire construction includes drafting 
(framing the questions for use in the field) and construc­
tion (planning the format of the questionnaire). Fourth, 
the field work, which includes pre-testing, training of 
interviewers, briefing, interviewing, controlling and 
verifying. The final stage is data processing, which in­
cludes coding, processing, analyzing and reporting the
24data.
When the polls are completed, and the results tabu­
lated, the staff can begin further organization of the 
campaign. Robert Agranoff explains various types of in­
formation pollster Lou Harris found useful in planning cam-
25paign strategy. Key group breakdowns, for example, will in­
dicate the political makeup of the constituency, including 
area differences, racial and religious patterns, nationality, 
group differences, occupational patterns, differences by 
size and place and how past elections were decided.
Polls also give campaign planners an indication of 
the public's perception of the candidate as a public figure, 
the candidate's name recognition, past voting record (if
15
any), and the candidate1s favorable and unfavorable quali- 
26ties. Political polls provide information indicating the 
public's opinion of issues and problems they consider most 
urgent. Finally, the researcher obtains information neces­
sary to develop the proper image, to shape the candidate's
27personality into one pleasing to the voters.
Various factors are merged in formulating a candidate's
overall image: the candidate's partisanship, position on
issues, public perception of the candidate's competence,
28and the candidate's personality. If a positive character­
istic be considered lacking, the media consultant in his 
planning should work with the candidate to correct the de­
ficiency.
ELEMENTS SHAPING A CANDIDATE'S IMAGE
Political images consist of individuals' subjective 
impressions, which include the public's perception of their 
elected official's campaign successes, personality traits, 
and leadership abilities. Also significant are their ap­
pearances, philosophies, intelligence, competence, and per-
29formance records. It must be kept in mind that politicians
are viewed as concerned, friendly, honest, or, at the other
end, indifferent, unfriendly, dishonest. Unfortunately,
these impressions are frequently based on hasty judgements,
inaccurate or incomplete information, biases, and distortion
30of motives or actions. Various elements work together to 
create ethos - the distinguishing character or tone of a
16
31person or group conveyed at a given time. If politicians 
implement methods of strengthening their credibility, for 
example, the credibility element of their ethos will improve. 
Other elements which shape the ethos are: character and trust­
worthiness, intelligence, identification and attractiveness, 
or charisma.32
Political scandals and unethical activities, such as 
Watergate, Abscam, and Brilab, have caused the public to care­
fully scrutinize the actions of their elected leaders and 
have made them more watchful for any trace of political manip­
ulation or deceit. Politicians must therefore be sure in 
their campaigns that their actions and words emphasize their 
good character and trustworthiness, and that their abiding 
interest is in meeting the needs of the electorate. Any trace 
of self-serving action, hidden motives, or undercover deals 
cannot but damage the candidate’s, or elected official's, 
credibility and, hence, his image.
Similarly, the politician’s character can be strength­
ened or weakened by the degree to which he displays sinceri- 
33ty. According to media specialist Gene Wyckoff, sincerity
34is viewed as even more preferable than skill. People are
more "tolerant of bumbles and obvious ineptness if the indi-
35vidual tries hard."
A second factor contributing to the politicians' cred-
36ibility is intelligence. They must appear knowledgeable 
concerning current and relevant issues, both general and 
particular.
Although public officials need not be considered "ex­
17
perts," they should still be viewed as competent, and al-
37most as important, self-confident. Studies reveal that a
source's competence is effective in influencing the recep-
38tion of that source's idea. Each time they display success 
in performing a task, their image of self-confidence can be 
enhanced.
Another important characteristic that strengthens the
39politician's credibility is identification with the audience.
He should always analyze the audience in order to gain better
understanding of its composition. According to Kenneth
Burke, politicians are persuasive insofar as they talk their
audience's language - by speech, gesture, tonality, image,
40and attitude - by identifying with their audience's way.
When such identification is achieved, politicians ap­
pear to share common values with their audience and this seems 
to increase their credibility. A good example of this was 
the immense success of John F. Kennedy's speech in West Berlin 
in the early 1960's. Kennedy won the hearts of those assem­
bled by stating, in German, "Ich bin cin Berliner." (I am a 
Berliner).
Another example of the importance of identification was 
provided by Louisiana's legendary governor, Huey P. Long.
In his travels through various section of Louisiana in the 
early thirties, Long successfully identified with the different 
groups by his dress and his accent. When speaking to a group 
of poor, uneducated farm workers, he wore casual slacks and 
spoke with a slightly broken accent. But, when addressing a
18
group of prominent New Orleans business executives, he would
wear a suit and necktie and speak at the intellectual level
of his audience. Such audience adaptation appeared to be a
significant element in Long's success. By identifying with
them appearing like them, being one of them, he strengthened
his credibility.
Credibility also allows the politician's ideas to be
4 1more readily accepted. By touching the emotions of the 
electorate, political officials can communicate a more per­
sonalized message. For example, instead of just talking Med­
icare, one could cite a specific case of a father, mother or 
other needy person benefited by Medicare. Instead of speak­
ing of Hubert Humphrey's record, one could emphasize how the
vice-president's work related to the peole and the national 
42welfare.
A final element of credibility is attraction, or charis-
43ma. The attraction of a candidate refers to the orientation
toward another person or persons; it involves a psychological
approach, rather than avoidance; moving toward someone, rath-
44er than against or away from them. Politicians' attraction 
can come from their observable talents, achievement, occupa­
tional status, personality and appearance, style, and over-
45all life experience.
A public official's interaction results in the public's
formulation of two different impressions - stylistic and po- 
46litical. Stylistic impressions refer to the official's po­
litical mannerisms and performances. This includes such fact­
ors as the politician's personality, personal background,
19
and campaign techniques.
The politician's image transmitted during his run for
office usually becomes a part of him, because of the greater
amount of his exposure during the campaign. The degree of
forcefulness, consideration, and sportsmanship exhibited by
the official provides valuable information to the public and
47contributes to his public's image. Therefore, by being al­
ways conscious of his campaign behavior, the politician may 
avoid the "creation" of information that the public may mis­
interpret.
Political impressions focus on the politician's govern­
ing actions and capacities, such as leadership, and ability,
48political background and issue positions. For example, the 
electorate had a negative political impression of Jimmy Carter 
during his presidency because they perceived him to be lack­
ing qualities as a leader. As a result, a great part of his 
1980 campaign was spent in his effort to strengthen this quali­
ty. Decisions such as the Tehran raid, as well-intentioned as 
they may have been, were generally considered also to be at­
tempts to erase his poor leadership impression.
The politician's physical delivery can be an important
49ingredient of his charisma. Politicians' delivery can pro­
ject an aura of crediblity by allowing their ideas to have 
maximum impact. The public official should be aware that good 
delivery reinforces the speaker's ideas. It should appear not
obtrusive, but natural and spontaneous, and be appropriate for
50the audience and the occasion.
Ronald Reagan's performance in the 1980 debate illus-
20
trates the role of good delivery in strengthening a poli­
tician's image. He employed various physical techniques to 
erase his negative image as a "dangerous" candidate. His 
use of "shrugs and smiles seemed to convince the public
that Carter's portrait of Reagan that of a weapon-prone,
5 1right winger, was a political caricature." He reinforced 
his message by using such simple devices as the waving of 
his hand and direct eye contact, thus indicating that non­
verbal behavior, too, can strengthen both the politician's 
message and his image.
Also vital to the politician's attempt to project a
positive image are his mannerisms, physical appearance,
52and dress. Here again the Reagan-Carter debates provide an
illustration. Reagan usually wore a dark, two-piece suit
and a dark tie, the traditional attire of presidents. This,
coupled with his large stature (compared with Carter's)
seemed greatly to aid his creation of a "presidential image."
His physical appearance was so imposing that even some of
Carter's aides conceded that Reagan's presence was Superior,
53was more that of a man to be called "Mr. President."
In contrast, Carter wore a more stylish blue suit, 
red and white tie, and a gold collar pin. Rather than 
appearing "presidential" his appearance was more that of a 
businessman. Seen next to Reagan, he appeared smaller, 
almost fragile, which seemed to emphasize the strong and 
authoritative figure of his opponent.
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Good vocal delivery can also enhance the politician's 
image. In their interaction with the public, the politi­
cian's vocal style, articulation, speech tempo, and pro-
3 4 •nunciation can be persuasive. Several qualities are pres­
ent in good vocal delivery.. First, the volume must be 
sufficiently loud and the tempo, or rate , slow enough to 
be heard without difficulty. Second, the delivery must 
be such as to create interest in the message. Third, the
vocal manner should contribute to the mood the speaker
5 5seeks to create.and not distract the listeners.
The Ted Kennedy-John McCormack senatorial debate in
the 1960's exemplifies the importance of vocal delivery.
As the debate became more heated, McCormack's image began
to diminish; "the tone and aggressive intent of McCormick's
remarks seemed to characterize him as an unpleasant and
56undesirable image candidate."
Accordingly, politicians should look to both their 
verbal and non-verbal behavior. In all situations, whether 
social or political, the politician can be judged by his 
gestures, mannerisms, and utterances which could be sub­
ject to public scrutiny.
The public official's image, synonymous with the 
people’s overall impression of the official, can often de­
termine the future of the political career. Therefore, 
ethos translates into a politician’s being positively per­
ceived by his audience, the voters. It is evident, there­
fore, that to be successful in the political arena, poli-
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ticians should recognize, understand and seek to control 
all the elements that make for a good image.
IMPORTANCE OF THE MASS MEDIA IN IMAGE-MAKING
Research has been conducted concerning the effect of 
mass media on the viewing public. The major conclusion in­
dicates that what the listener, viewer, or reader brings in­
to the media situation (his background and preconceived
motions) is a much more important determinant of media im-
57pact than anything in the media themselves. His is a per­
ception of the image of the particular media source.
Political participants themselves have recognized the 
importance of the candidate's image in a campaign and the 
significant role the various media play in the image-making 
process. There is among them, however, disagreement as 
to the most effective medium for political communication.
A study by Atwood and Sanders noted considerable var-
58iance in audience perceptions of media use and credibility.
Keating and Latane refer to a Roper study which found that
from 1959 to 1971 TV had overtaken newspapers as the source
from which most people received their news. TV was also
59the most believable medium. The Roper study compared 
television, radio, newspapers, and magazines and found 
television to be the most believable and desirable medium.
The study showed that 65% of respondents received most in­
formation on candidates through television, which 24%
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selected newspapers, and 4% radio.
Prior to television and radio, the most important
component of a candidate's image was probably his personal
character and reputation, as depicted by newspapers, pam-
61phlets, posters, and campaign slogans. The advancement of 
communication technology, however, has changed the art of 
political campaigning.
62Newspapers are more informative than television.
Studies revealed that in the 1968 and 1972 presidential 
campaigns more people reported voting for the candidate 
espoused by newspapers than those promoted by other media. 
The studies also revealed that newspapers seem more ef­
fective because they eliminate confusing arguments of 
63campaigns.
Granting that newspapers are a highly informative
source, there is question concerning their effectiveness.
Media specialist Gene Wyckoff argues that newspapers are
less influential than television in conveying a candidate's 
64image. He claims that readers derive their image of the 
candidate’s character from descriptions of their deeds and 
reputation, whereas viewers judge character from directly 
perceived appearance and demeanor. Furthermore, says Wy­
ckoff, television images are more effective because they are 
perceived directly, whereas newspaper images must be de­
rived by indirect perceptual process: the reader first 
sees printed data and then, through his cognitive pro­
cesses interprets the data; only then can he formulate an
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fk ̂image from the printed data. On the other hand./ some indi­
viduals claim newspapers to be the most effective conveyance
6 6of a candidate’s image. According to Thomas Patterson, "the
6 7newspaper is the superior transmitter of information.
Throughout the 1940’s, radio was the most trusted and
popular political medium in America; but with the upsurge
of television in the fifties, radio's political appeal de-
68clined significantly. Today, although not as frequently 
used as the other media, radio is effective in reaching 
those audiences generally missed by newspapers and tele­
vision. According to Dan Nimmo, the average suburban com­
muter spends ninety minutes of every working day in his 
69car. Millions of housewives listen to radio while doing 
their chores and many of the elderly, who grew up with 
the radio, still rely on its news broadcasts for informa­
tion about politics.7 3̂
Selection of the vehicle for communicating a politi­
cal message is frequently dependent on the given situa­
tion. Regardless of which is the primary vehicle used, 
the other media should be included to augument the primary 
one. According to Roger Ailes, former media consultant 
for Richard Nixon, the media used in a campaign should be 
coordinated "so that when television is running, radio and
print and whatever else you’re going to do ... is running
71at the same time to get maximum synergistic effect."
Since 1960, television had become the favorite medium
72
for communicating political messages and was the primary
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medium used in Louisiana's gubernatorial campaign of 1979.
Further illustrating its virtues is the fact that television
evokes, both aural and visual attention. "Unlike written
or audio speeches, TV provides a concrete image of the
speaker. Facial expressions and bodily gestures as well
73as verbal intonation punctuate a message." It affords
the political candidate a different more dramatic way to
communicate with his electorate and, although it is an
expensive and technical medium, its usage "endows the can-
74didate with an aura of importance."
"While television pictures lack any capacity to en­
lighten voters about the candidate's policy positions,
they certainly contribute to the development of people's
75images of the candidate " ‘ Keating and Latane supported 
this contention by citing the 1960.Presidential debate. 
Although the Kennedy-Nixon debates failed to alter the
attitudes of the electorate toward the debate issue, the
76image of the candidates was changed by the debates.
Research indicates that a variety of viewers tend to
see the same personal image of a televised candidate, but
77that the influence of the candidate's image may vary. The
most common effect of a candidate's image on the viewing
7 8electorate is crystallization, rather than conversion.
For example, the public's belief that Kennedy's image was 
superior to Nixon's aroused more voters, already inclined 
toward a Democrat candidate, to work for and vote for 
Kennedy. Crystallizations indicate the electorate will
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vote for the candidate of the party to which they were
79habitually inclined.
In past elections the use of issues in campaigns "have
been either ignored or underplayed because the don't lend
8 0themselves to television advertising or journalism."
The emphasis has been on candidates persuading the elector­
ate by focusing on their personal image. Since the 1960's, 
the electorate has been persuaded more by a candidate's 
projected image than by the candidate's stance on political
issues. Frequently, though, the candidate does use issues
81to enhance his image. Some research indicates that the 
electorate has difficulty recalling campaign issues. Ap­
proximately 25% of the electorate could not recall any
82issue during a senatorial campaign in 1972.
In political advertisements, words often seem less 
important than pictures. The effectiveness of the ad­
vertisement "can come from the dramatic whole, from the 
rapid sequence of still pictures, each a frozen movement
itself, slipping by so fast as to leave a mere impression
83of a greater-than-life character." Another of televxsion's
strong points is the fact that TV sets are found in ap-
84proximately 98% of American households. "We are now a
visual world. The majority of the population has lost its
ability to visualize ... TV is a substitute for the non-
85thinking person."
Television, however, is not a flawless political aid. 
There are limitations to its ability to project effective-
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ly a candidate’s image. Hofstetler contends that politi­
cal ads can reinforce or strengthen a pre-existing image, 
issue positions, and candidate perceptions. "Any changes 
in viewer imagery of perception ... might be mostly in de­
gree or intensity, but not in direction. Television,
then, would not seem to be as great a tool for viewer man-
86ipulation as might be expect."
Even though television is a highly influential mass
communication channel, "no sensible candidate places ex-
87elusive reliance on it." Campaign experts generally ad­
vise the usage of all available media. Various other ad­
vertising devices should be considered - billboards, radio, 
television, newspapers, letter writing, telephone committee 
programs, handbills. The cartridges "must be fired be­
cause, among the multitude of blanks, one may be a bullet." 
We might say that candidates are marketed, similar to the 
way a company markets its products.
Joe McGinnis, in his book. The Selling of the Presi­
dent, explained the serious problem he and Richard Nixon’s 
staff encountered during the 1968 presidential campaign 
in the effort to present Nixon to the voting public.
Now you put him on television, you've got a prob­
lem right away. He's a funny-looking guy. He 
looks like somebody hung him in a closet over­
night and he jumps out in the morning with his 
suit all bunched up and starts running around'say­
ing, 'I want to be president." I mean this is how 
he strikes some people. That’s why these shows 
(his advertisements! are important. To make them 
forget all of that. ^
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To enhance Nixon's image, McGinnis' advertising staff
took control of all aspects of his presentation to the
public. The staff members insisted on creating a proper,
controlled environment for their candidate. For example,
a televised panel discussion featuring Nixon was planned to
project him as knowledgeable and well-respected, personal
qualities lacking in Nixon's unsuccessful presidential
campaign of 1960. In preparing the show, such factors as
proper color, designs, sounds, and lighting were selected.
In this endeavor they went so far as to have Johnny Carson's
make-up man prepare Nixon for the cameras. The carefully
chosen panel for the discussion included one Negro (two
would have looked too obvious), a Jewish lawyer, the
president of a local Polish-Hungarian group, a housewife,
a businessman, a representative of a middle-class group,
and two newsmen. The panel members were briefed as to
90which questions they were to ask.
The audience attending the panel discussion, also 
carefully chosen, included 300 citizens, black and white, 
from a local Republican organization. Since no reporters 
were allowed in the audience, the planned production went 
unnoticed. Following certain remarks made by Nixon, an 
applause sign would appear and the crowd would cheer. At 
the close of the show, the audience was instructed to 
"mob Nixon," thus creating the impression that Nixon was
91enthusiastically received.
This elaborate show, and other techniques used by 
the advertising staff, were successful in "selling" their 
candidate, in convincing the public that Nixon was the 
best man for the office of president.
Other devices employed to aid in communicating the 
political message to the, voters were used in Jimmy Carter1s 
1976 presidential campaign. The media consultant, Jerry 
Rafshoon, focused on five-minute commercials (which pre­
viously had never been attempted). The purpose of the
commercials was to insure that Carter would have more to
92say on the issues than any of his opponents. The format 
of the commercials was substantially: Carter would touch 
on five or six questions, devoting 40-50 seconds to each, 
rather than dwelling on any single issue. This technique 
was designed better to hold audience attention. Accord­
ing to Carter's campaign manager, Hamilton Jordon, "Can­
didates don't create issues. Issues exist in the minds
93of the voters. Candidates respond."
Another technique employed by the Carter team was 
the use of two-minute ads, considered more effective than 
five-minute ones. Rafshoon then decided to mix the two 
and five-minute ads. This combination proved to be an ef­
fective strategy, for later in the campaign viewers often
thought the commercials were network news programs, in-
94stead of political advertisements.
David Garth, political consultant from New York, has
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employed many unique and successful techniques in his po-
95litical advertisements. An example was evident in his
handling of John Lindsay's 1965 New York mayoral campaign.
Garth had the attractive, but unpopular Lindsay campaign
"through the streets of New York, coat over his shoulder,
shirt sleeves rolled up, tie askew, the picture of youth
and vigor in a city bored and disenchanted with the pre-
96dictable plodding ways of 'Bumbling Bob' Wagner." This 
type of campaigning was an effective element in Garth's 
image-making process.
Dan Walker's gubernatorial campaign is another ex­
ample of the success of Garth's technique. Walker had
been the "quintessence of a slicked-down, limousine-riding
97business executive," until he hired Garth, who drastical­
ly changed that image. His hair grew longer, the fancy 
suits came off, replaced by blue jeans, flannel shirts 
and a red bandana. Walker was elected.
Garth's ads are usually simple, direct and honest.
His commercials come across not as overly impressive, but
are effective. His advertising uses printed key words at
93the bottom of the TV screen, "to amplify and expand." In 
his commercials there is considerable information that the 
viewer cannot take in all at one viewing. "Our commercials 
are designed for the long haul," he says. "We know that 
people are going to be seeing them ten to twelve times 
during a campaign and we want to keep them interested. We 
want to leave them with a bit of a message everytime they
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see it, so that by the end of the campaign they, will have
99taken in a lot of facts backing up one impression.”
Gene Wyckoff suggests that TV commercials should be
moving - a visual continuity, reaction shots, and pictorial
100flowing from one sequence to another. He notes that a 
common mistake in political ads is to dwell too much on 
the candidate, that more shots should be shown, for ex­
ample, of concerned people listening. Another mistake is
that campaign films often talk too much. Rather, the ad-
101vertiser should "let the drama speak."
Wyckoff favors the use of such techniques as "cutting 
to music," and "ancestral motivation." The first term 
emphasizes the importance of proper-music in advertising.
It provides a muscial buildup to "catch the audience in 
the mounting excitement.” For this technique to be suc­
cessful, he says the music must flow in a proper rhyth- 
102mic montage.
As ancestral motivation Wyckoff uses certain elements
103of personality in campaign tactics. The family tradition 
theme has been successfully used by many politicians who 
have an ancestry of political figures. It employs emotion­
al appeal in presenting the candidate's message.
Another suggestion of Wyckoff is that dramatic com­
mercials make the candidate remembered: "frequently words
104can be less important than pictures." The effect, there­
fore, can come from the dramatic whole: "from the rapid 
sequence of still pictures, each a frozen moment in itself,
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slipping by so fast as to leave mere impressions of a
105greater-than-life character."
Other production techniques that may increase or
heighten the illusion that the political campaign is a
drama are the reaction shot and the rigid time-period
factor. The reaction shot shows a candidate surrounded
by applauding and cheering people as he finishes a speech
or appears at a political function, seeking to give the
impression that the candidate has positive effect on his 
106audience.
The rigid time-period fact device, employed when the 
advertiser has only a few seconds of minutes to communi­
cate the message, calls for the commercial to be concise 
and the impression is based not on substance, but rather on
*. i 107style.
Another method to create the proper image is panel
discussions carried on by several intellectual or well-
108known people who interview the candidate. The intent
of this format is to create the illusion of endorsements 
by well-known citizens, The members on the panel ask 
prepared questions which allow the candidate to state 
his views on the particular issue. In these panels, the 
entire format must be completely rehearsed to avoid the 
embarrassment of the participants being caught off guard.
The filmed documentaries plan is an entertaining 
format for making political appeals, a technique similar
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109to those used in show business. A symbolic scene repre­
senting the film's basic theme is devised, and repeated 
at appropriate times, to convey to the audience the de­
sired image. The strategy here is "don't reveal too much 
about the candidate; give the impression that he can con­
trol situations without actually showing him doing so.
Keep the candidate off the screen by using his voice with
110his picture, but not the candidate himself." In this,
by maximizing the visual effects, the pictures can speak
for themselves; the spoken is adapted to the visual, rather
than the reverse. The same phrases are not used repeatedly.
In personal appearances the politician must be redundant
1 H\ to give attention, but this is not true of film.
Finally, Wyckoff's studies show that television
viewers learn more from hearing the audio and watching an
unrelated video than from having the speaker give them
112the message via audio and video together.
According to Dan Nimmo, it is all-important in TV
advertising to select spots where there is the heaviest
viewing audience and an audience composed of the elector-
113ate composition the candidate wants to address. Advertis­
ers feel that personalities not issues or political parties, 
win votes. Therefore, the advertisers plan should be to 
"continue spontaneity, and make the effort to appear un­
inhibited, candid, open, and credible, without an unre-
114hearsed performance."
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The advisors exploit the best features of the candi- 
date in order to form his political personality - how he 
performs on the medium, his political role, and his po­
litical qualities. The political role of the candidate 
refers to the impression he gives of his ability as a 
politician - his astuteness, grasp of issues, knowledge, 
and ability to control any situation. Depiction of his 
personal qualities should show him to be sympathetic -
115able to share the feelings and emotions of his audience.
His personality should relate to "the attention - getting
116image of ourselves, our image of our behavior. Cam­
paign advisors should intermingle all these aspects of per­
sonality. This, as all phases of a successful campaign, 
requires a team of advertising experts with a sound pro­
gram, a media plan which is a strategic blueprint, listing
117the campaign's assumptions and the objectives.
Included in the media plan are the personality traits
that need to be stressed, the issues that may arise, and
the basic image that should be created. Also, the plan
must be designed with the mood of the state, parish, or
nation in mind. The plan also outlines the form the
advertisements should take and the way it should be mar-
118keted, targeted, and phased.
The assumptions of the plan relate to the environment, 
the candidates' position at the beginning of the campaign, 
and the objectives indicate where the candidate would like
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to be at the end of the campaign; the object is to get the 
candidate to that position.
Campaign appeals are usually made to specific groups, 
but there should be concern about a backlash of opposi­
tion. Democrats ordinarily attempt to hold together their 
electoral coalition, while Republicans try to increase
their base of support by denying the accusation that they
119are the party of the rich and big business.
Frequently, the plan of the campaign is to destroy the 
image of the opposition. Instead of playing to their can­
didate's strength, they attack the opposition's weakness. 
This strategy was seen in 1964, when the Democrats attacked 
Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater on his 
stand on nuclear weapons with an advertisement showing a
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CHAPTER III 
AN OVERVIEW OP THE CAMPAIGN
Six major candidates sought to succeed Edwin Edwards, 
the outgoing, two-term Democratic governor, in the 1979 
Louisiana gubernatorial campaign. All six were complet­
ing terms as elected public officials.
THE CANDIDATES
James E. Fitzmorris, of New Orleans; completing his 
eighth year as Lieutenant-Governor. He also served as 
Chairman of the state board of Commerce and Industry.
Paul J. Hardy, St. Martinville; elected to the State 
Senate in 1972 and, in 1976, elected Secretary of State.
E. L. "Bubba" Henry (only north Louisianian in the 
race); elected Speaker of the House in 1972, a position 
he held during the campaign.
Louis J. Lambert of Gonzales; elected to the State 
Senate in 1972 and in 1974 elected to the State Public 
Service Commission.
Edgar "Sonny" Mouton of Lafayette; member of the House 
of Representatives 1964-66; a State Senator from 1966-1979, 
and President Pro Tempore of the Senate.
David Treen, also from New Orleans, was the only Repub­
lican in the campaign. He was elected to the U. S. House of
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Representatives in 1972. In 1975, Treen was an unsuccessful 
candidate for governor. He was re-elected to Congress in 
1978 and served in that capacity during the campaign.
THE MEDIA CONSULTANTS
Since 1964, the choice of the media manager of a 
campaign has been critical to the candidacy of the individ­
ual. The choice has ranked with that of campaign manager 
and chief fund raiser as a first imperative of candidacy.
The media man must be artist and businessman all at once.
He must be able to shoot film, to edit the film, to buy
the time slots, and to locate network audiences he hopes
^ 1 to reach.
The enormous amount of money each candidate had
collected for the campaign enabled all to employ top talent
in media consultants, "the men who decide how to present
2the candidate to the voters." The consultants enlisted, 
prominent both nationally and locally, presented Louisiana's 
television-viewing voters with political TV which matched 
in quality that of a presidential campaign.
Rusty Cantelli and Tom Varisco, from New Orleans, pro­
duced the television commercials for Lt. Governor Jimmy 
Fitzmorris. Relatively new media consultants, their larg­
est account up to that time had been State Senator Nat 
Keifer's unsuccessful bid in 1978 for mayor of New Orleans. 
Raymond Strother and Gus Weill, of Baton Rouge, managed
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the media portion of Paul Hardy's campaign. Strother and 
Weill had been associated with Louisiana politics for more 
than twenty years and had managed numerous campaigns, in­
cluding Edwin Edwards' successful re-election in 1975 and 
several other statewide campaigns in 1979.
Bubba Henry hired Charles Guggenheim of Washington,
D. C. His "reputation as a media consultant is formidable.
He has produced television for two presidential, and more
3than sixty gubernatorial campaigns." His productions 
have won two Academy Awards for documentary films. He 
also managed Senator Edward Kennedy's 1980 presidential 
campaign.
Three different consultants managed Louis Lambert's
media campaign. Jim Carvin, of New Orleans, the first
Lambert hired, had been involved in Louisiana politics
for more than thirty years. He had managed more than
fifty campaigns in the state, including Edwin Edward's
successful 1971 gubernatorial race; the 1978 campaign of
Ernest Morial, New Orlean's first black mayor; and Gillis
Long's unsuccessful bid for governor in 1965. Carvin was
later replaced with Robert Squires of Washington, D. D.,
another nationally-prominent media consultant. Squires
was later replaced by Strother and Weill.
Sonny Mounton began his campaign with David Garth of
New York, "the heavyweight champion of political consul- 
4tants." Garth's political victories have included his 
handling of Hugh Carey's Gubernatorial campaign, Mayor
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Edward Koch's successful quests for mayor of New York, and 
the election of Los Angeles1 Tom Bradley, the first black 
mayor of a major city. Garth's political record lists 71 
victories and only 16 defeats. These victories include- 
elections of state candidates, gubernatorial candidates, and 
U. S. senators and representatives. Midway through the cam­
paign, however, Mouton became dissatisfied with his campaign 
and replaced Garth with Charles Roemer of Bossier City, 
Louisiana, Governor Edwin Edwards' commissioner of adminis- 
stration. Roemer served Mouton as media consultant until 
the end of the campaign.
Dave Treen employed Ronald Facheaux and Jim Farwell, 
the two youngest media men in the campaign. With the ex­
ception of Governor Edwards' 1971 campaign, this campaign 
was the first major media-consulting experience for Faucheaux 
and Farwell. They received assistance from professional 
Republican media consultants from Houston and Los Angeles.
CAMPAIGN EXPENSES
In Louisiana voters were exposed to the most expensive 
gubernatorial campaign in the state's history. The guber­
natorial candidates spent $13.4 million through the re­
porting period that ended fifteen days before the primary
election. Of this amount, approximately $8 million went
. . 5for advertising.
Other campaign costs included public opinion polls,
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fees paid to political organizations, telephone banks, 
direct mailings, signs and posters, and paid staff mem­
bers .
Television advertising is expensive and costs approx­
imately $4000. for producing a 60 second advertisement. If 
the media consultant elects to hire a film crew and produce
a 60-second commercial, "on location," the cost can increase
6to upward of $30,000 per advertisement.
Added to the candidate's campaign expenses is the
cost of television time. The charge for time depends upon
the television station and its ratings. Generally, a 60-
second "prime time" interval during the campaign ran be-
7tween $500 and $1600.
Media consultants receive approximately 15 percent 
in commissions for placing political advertisements. For 
example, Raymond Strother's fee for handling Paul Hardy's 
campaign ranged from $2500 a month to $10,000 a month. In 
addition, Strother received 15 percent of the cost of all
gtelevision time. Cantelli and Varisco's fee for the
Fitzmorris campaign was "$100,000 or 15 percent of the
9media money spent, whichever is greater."
Lambert had raised approximately $2.85 million as of 
October 12, 1979, and spent more than $2.9 million during 
that time. Most of his expenditures were for media ad­
vertising, which totaled $1.6 million in payments to agen­
cies alone. He also made payments of slightly less than 
$300,000 to Matt Reese and Associates, an internationally
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10known political organizing and canvassing firm.
Lambert spent approximately $11,270 on political or­
ganizations which endorsed him. He gave money to more than 
forty groups,which "are supposed to provide canvassing,
advertising, ballot distribution and other campaign and
11election day services."
The runoff cost Lambert approximately an additional
$800,000, according to campaign finance disclosure reports.
The campaign period extended from October 28 to December 8.
He spent approximately $150,000 from his campaign funds
in a court battle defending his second-place finish in the
12October 27 primary election.
OFFICIAL RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN
The official results of the October 27, 1979 open 
primary indicated that Democrat Louis Lambert would face 
front runner Republican Dave Treen for the Louisiana gov­
ernorship on December 8. Of the 1.9 million registered 
voters in the state of Louisiana, "approximately 1.4 mil­
lion votes were cast for governor, or 70.5 percent of all
13registered voters in the state."
The official vote revealed that 17,000 votes separated 
the three top candidates. Dave Treen received 297,674 
votes, or 21.8 percent of the total's, Louis Lambert was 
second, receiving 283,266 votes or 20.7 percent; and Jimmy 
Fitzmorris was third, with 280,760 votes, or 20.6 percent. 
The other major candidates were Paul Hardy with 227,026
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votes (16.6%); E. L. "Bubba" Henry with 135,769 (9.9%); 
and Sonny Mouton with 124,333 (9.1%). The unofficial re­
sults of the open primary election were contested by Fitz- 
morris who originally finished second in the unofficial 
count. However, the later official total placed Lambert 
second. After several days of court proceedings, Fitz- 
morris's suit was dismissed and Lambert was declared the 
second place finisher.
Lambert's highest support came primarily from a large
block of parishes, consisting of the Florida parishes.
and those bordering the Mississippi River, from Point
Coupee to St. John. Lambert's lowest support came from the
Acadia and Lafayette parishes and' the northwest area of
the state. He finished first in two standard metropolitan
statistical areas - Baton Rouge (40.9%) and Lake Charles
(23%), and second in Alexandria with 20.4% of the vote. The
official statistics showed Lambert receiving the most black
14support of the campaign, with 40% of the total black vote.
In the December 8 general election, Republican Treen 
defeated Democrat Lambert to become Louisiana's first Re­
publican governor since the Reconstruction era. Treen re­
ceived 50.3% or 690,691 votes to Lambert's 49.7% or 681,134 
votes. Although Lambert carried 42 parishes compared with 
Treen's 22 parishes, the voter participation in the parish­
es carried by Treen provided the necessary margin of victory. 
Lambert received his largest support in Allen, Red River,
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Jackson, and the Florida parishes. Lambert captured 5 0.3%
15of the urban vote compared with Treen's 53.1%. Although 
Lambert again received solid black support, approximately 
90% of the black vote, it was not enough to overcome Treen's 
majority.
LOUIS LAMBERT - THE MAN
Louis Lambert, born in DeRidder, Louisiana, December 
21, 194 0, grew up in Sorrento, Louisiana in Ascension Parish. 
He has been a resident of Gonzales, Louisiana since 1966.
He attended the public school system in Ascension Parish, 
studied at Southeastern Louisiana University, and re­
ceived his B.A. from Louisiana State University in Baton 
Rouge. After earning his law degree from Loyola Univers­
ity in New Orleans, Lambert practiced law in Gonzales and 
later served as that municipality's city attorney. He is
married to the former Mary Gayle Smith of Gonzales. They
16are the parents of three children.
Lambert was first elected to public office in 1971 as 
a state senator from District 18, which encompasses As­
cension, St. James, and Livingston parishes. As a senator, 
he served in the Finance, Transportation and Highways agen­
cies and Local and Municipal Affairs Committees. In No­
vember, 1972, he was elected a delegate to the Constitution­
al Convention, during which he was named chairman of the 
Committee on Natural Resources and Environment.
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In 1974, Lambert was elected to the Public Service 
Commission from a district comprising over one-third of 
the state - parts of Southeast Louisiana and most of South­
west Louisiana, from Calcasieu, Beauregard, and Cameron
on the west, to East and West Feliciana, Tangipahoa, and
Livingston on the east, and East Baton Rouge on the North.
When the Public Service Commission was expanded from three
to five members, Lambert's district was reduced to the
Flordia parishes, the Baton Rouge area, and various river
parishes. Following his election to the Public Service17
Commission, he was selected that commision's chairman.
Lambert had hoped to use his membership on the Public
Service Commission as a springboard to the governor's
office, the strategy successfully employed by three past
Louisiana governors, Huey P. Long, Jimmie H. Davis, and
John J. McKeithen, all of whom were members of that agency
during their gubernatorial campaigns. "That route to the
mansion has required a bit of populist approach. Long
certainly had the common touch,. Davis was everybody’s
favorite country singer, and McKeithen became identified
18
with the nickel phone call." Lambert had hoped to follow
the populist tradition by campaigning to "make fuel more
available to Louisianians at cheaper prices, hold down
utility costs, make the nuclear plants shape up and fight
19OPEC to the last drop."
Lambert gained statewide political attention by con­
fronting the big utility companies on a variety of issues.
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In the Senate, in the Constitutional convention, and as
Public Service Commission Chairman, he had attacked the
utility companies. In his announcement for governor, he
made his positions clear. He was against nuclear power?
he favored doing away with industrial tax exemptions; he
wanted to bar utilities from charging consumers in advance
for the cost of power plant construction, and he opposed
permitting the phone companies to charge subscribers for
directory assistance calls.
Lambert planned to follow his past political campaign
philosophy for sharing his political ideas with the public.
111 will take my case directly and forthrightly to the
people who, I believe, have always seen in me a true friend,
and a man who has always stood by their interests: I am
confident of their sound reason and their strong desires
to elect a man who can improve the lot of all the people
of this state, a man who has never been captured by special20
interests or forgotten from where he came."
THE ISSUES
Finding the most compelling issues in any political 
campaign is no easy matter. Different candidates stress 
different issues. Lambert's initial basic platform consist­
ed of four major planks: public education quality, guberna­
torial appointments, taxation and finance, and labor-manage-
21
ment relations.
"I find no businessman, no mother, no father, who does
52
not agree with me that Louisiana1s number one problem is
22
the poverty of its educational system. One of his 
public education plans was to strengthen screening devices 
(such as teacher placement tests) to insure teacher com­
petency. He also urged schools to participate in insuring 
classroom competence by hiring above average new teachers, 
improving education policies, awarding less tenure, im­
plementing in-service programs for faculty, and encourag­
ing teachers to work together to perfect skills. Finally, 
Lambert proposed that the allocation of state education 
dollars be made on a program basis, rather than a pupil-to- 
dollar basis.
Lambert's plan for improvement of gubernatorial ap­
pointments was to employ the most competent and independent 
people. His proposal called for the use of a task force 
to advise in the selection of appointments. "The general 
criteria I will adopt are an emphasis on minorities, women 
and young people, as well as ordinary citizens who possess
various talents, but have never been asked to serve in 
23government."
A third area of interest to Lambert was taxation and 
finance. He announced his intentions of controlling 
spending and establishing priorities so that more and high­
er taxes are not required. On the issue of state aid to 
local government, he argued that state support of local
government "must be based on the long run development of
24
the region and the state - not on charity."
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The topic of labor management relations was of con­
cern to all candidates in the race, primarily due to the 
controversial Right-to-Work Law, which was strongly sup­
ported by business groups, but bitterly opposed by labor 
groups. Lambert's official comment on this issue was:
"I feel that the Right-to-Work Law has not been in effect 
long enough to determine its true economic impact. An in­
dependent study should consider the effect of the law on 
employment, industrial inducement, living standards and 
economic growth.112 ̂
Although Lambert's positions at the outset of the 
campaign portrayed him in the image of a populist, he was 
prepared for criticism: "In each of my elections I have been 
opposed by large and special interests. I am not their
26captive and will never be... in the forthcoming election."
LAMBERT'S POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
According to longtime Louisiana political observer 
Edmund Reggie, organization is a key ingredient in a po­
litical campaign. "Our (Louisiana) political organization 
is so much better, so much more in detail than other 
states. We organize campaigns in this state, statewide,
and that is over 2,000 precincts. We organize them down to
27the precinct level."
A campaign organization is a group of people whose 
coordinated efforts are aimed at helping elect the candi­
date they support. The groups consists of supporters who
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have assumed leadership roles, volunteers who have agreed 
to work in the campaign, and all voters who have been iden­
tified as supporting the candidate. The strength of an 
organization depends on the number of people involved, their
dedication to the candidate, and how well they are moti-
28
vated and organized.
Lambert's state headquarters was located in Baton Rouge, 
and it was at this location that his organization staff 
was housed. This staff, responsible for proper and con­
tinuous commications at all levels of the campaign, con­
sisted of the campaign director, political director, field 
director, communications director, finance chairman, vol­
unteer director, dialogue chairman, leadership survey di­
rector, Go-Day director, scheduling director, labor liaison,
29minority liaison, and headquarters manager.
The "Campaign Political Committee" geographically 
organized the state by using committees. The committee 
consisted of two regional directors. One of them organ­
ized the North staff, consisting of a Northwest and North­
east manager; the other organized the South staff, employ­
ing the Southwest, Acadia, and South Central managers and
managers for the Florida and River parishes, as well as
30Jefferson and Orleans Parish.
There were also two regional field floaters. These 
individuals were in the field making personal contact with 
district and parish coordinators. Their duties consisted 
of resolving difficulties that arose among fieldworkers,
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giving state headquarters another perspective on activi­
ties in the field, and monitoring the progress of projects 
originating at headquarters. The Floaters reported to 
their respective regional coordinators for direction.
When completed, Lambert's organization was ready to 
assume responsibility for strategic planning, decision­
making, information gathering and the vital communicating 
necessary in the course of political campaigns. He was 
ready to begin.
THE BEGINNING STRATEGY
Jim Garvin's first poll for Lambert was taken by 
Bowles and Groves of Dallas, Texas in early 1978. The 
purpose of the poll was to determine Lambert's name recog­
nition throughout the state. The results revealed that he 
had a low name recognition outside his Public Service dis­
trict. Although not desirable, at the outset of a campaign 
this is not necessarily harmful to the individual's candi­
dacy. Both John J. McKeithen and Edwin Edwards, for example,
had low name recognition before they began campaigning for 
31governor.
But Lambert's low name recognition prompted Garvin 
and other advisors to make an early official announce­
ment. They planned an elaborate public announcement, to be 
unfolded during a three day period. The first announcement 
came during a press conference in New Orleans on the morn­
ing of June 28th. Lambert and his staff then in private
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planes flew to Baton Rouge for a noon annoucement and to 
Shreveport for a cocktail party and fund-raising event 
that evening. The next morning they flew to Monroe for 
a press conference, to Alexandria for a noon luncheon, 
and then to Lafayette for another fund-raising meet. On 
the final day, June 30th, they held a morning press con­
ference in Lake Charles; flew to Houma for another,
and completed the day with an afternoon press conference 
32in Hammond.
During the three-day announcement period, staff workers 
and volunteers placed 4 x 8  signs in the Florida parishes, 
in sections of north Louisiana, and along stretches of In­
terstate 10 between New Orleans and Lake Charles. The 
signs were dark blue, with the message, "Lambert, '80 
Governor," printed in white and light blue.
Garvin's next strategy was to prepare a tabloid em-
33phasizing Lambert's various positive qualities. The 8-page 
color tabloid positioned Lambert with students, farmers, 
oil and seafood employees, his family, and Public Service 
Commission members and Carvin arranged for the tabloid to 
appear as a supplement to the Baton Rouge Sunday Advocate, 
the New Orleans Times-Picayune, the Lafayette Advertiser, 
the Lake Charles American Press, the Zachary Plainsman 
News, the Sunday Iberian, the Opelousas Sunday World, the 
Houma Courier, the Slidell Times, the Daily Sentry News, 
the Clinton Watchman, the St. Francisville Democrat, the 
Gonzales Weekly, the Greater Plaquemine Post, the Bogalusa
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Sunday Mews, and the Slidell News Banner, and in news­
papers in the northern part of the state.
The main purpose for circulating the tabloid state­
wide was to extend Lambert's name recognition. Each cam­
paign year, the Baton Rouge Advocate commissions a state­
wide survey to estimate the strength of potential guberna­
torial candidates and it was hoped that the tabloid would
34
also "influence the Advocate poll." Carvin had placed
the tabloids in the various newspapers two weeks prior to 
the 1979 poll, at a cost of approximately $100,000.
The results of the initial Advocate gubernatorial 
polling showed Dave Treen and Jimmy Fitzmorris "significant­
ly ahead of all other potential candidates. Although Lam­
bert was in fourth place with 6-7%, he was in front of pos­
sible candidates such as Commissioner of Administration, 
Charles Roemer and Attorney General William Guste. The re­
sults of the poll made Lambert a viable candidate in the
35eyes of the press and the public."
During the opening stages of the campaign, Carvin or­
ganized the distribution throughout the state of bumper 
stickers, 4 x 8  signs, billboards, buttons, and literature. 
His production and circulation of these various support 
materials began the public phase of Lambert's image-making. 
The primary purpose of support materials is to increase
the positive name recognition of a candidate, "to have a
36set of identifiers that people can understand," or "to
37reinforce the support a candidate is already receiving."
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Carvin was careful in his choice of Lambert's campaign 
colors because of the importance of colors in overall image 
creation. "The link between color and a product, consist­
ently pursued, leads to subconscious identification, [and]
is used by advertising artists with particular success in
38the creation of an image." The impact of the candidate's
selected color is usually made on the subconscious level
of the electorate. Although a person may be unconscious
of the colors around him, his behavior may be powerfully
affected by these colors. Tests have shown that colors
39can add to the retentive power of an image. Carvin
used a royal blue color in all Lambert's campaign support 
materials because "it is not a color that turns people 
off. It's a cool color and it has a neutral effect ... al­
so, Lambert had gray hair and it (his hair) worked well 
40with blue.
Media consultants frequently rely on particular colors 
which may reinforce an intended image of the candidate. 
they wish to project. Jimmy Carter, for example, used the 
color green in his 1976 presidential campaign. This in­
frequently used political color aided the Carter staff in 
their attempts to portray Carter as a different, new poli­
tician. While campaigning as an "outsider" trying to re­
store honesty and integrity to the White House, Carter's 
use of the green color seemed to support his image as a 
new breed of politician.
Another example of color selection in a political cam-
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paign was Paul Hardy's use of a redish-orange color in his 
1979 gubernatorial campaign. This color apparently was 
used to reinforce Hardy's overall image of a flamboyant, 
aggressive candidate.
In.summary, the color a candidate uses can support 
the image he attempts to create. Although colors are not 
A main element in the image-making process, they have 
proved helpful in aiding an establishment of an overall 
image.
With the campaign strategy planned and his organization 
intact, Louis Lambert's campaign for governor of Louisiana 
was prepared for the long and extensive race- A vital . 
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As related, Louis Lambert's media consultant for the
beginning of his campaign, Phase I, was Jim Carvin. Car-
vin's style in producing political commercials lays special
stress on the artistic quality of filming and on the
staging of the ads, but is active in all phases of the
campaign work. For each advertisement, Carvin "writes the
spot, plans it, then shoots the spot so that I know that
the end product is what I started out with on a piece of 
1paper." He also is involved in political strategy and
campaign organizing, planning the campaign "along the lines
of a svstem developed for b u i l d i n g  a nuclear submarine.
It's intended to ensure that everything gets done at the
right time, that everything possible is anticipated, and
2that there's flexibility for emergencies."
Carvin's image-making strategy for Lambert's campaign
was "to position Lambert in the middle of the road, as a
populist candidate who was generally conservative ... a
conservative populist, very much in the style of Edwin
3Edwards and John McKeithen." Carvin planned to have 
Lambert appeal to blacks and to blue-collar voters by 
meeting them in face-to-face settings. His rationale . 
for this strategy was that many blacks and blue-collar
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voters are more than ordinarily concerned with such problems
as family income and health care. Only during the last
couple of weeks of the campaign do they become firmly de-
4cided for which candidate they will vote. By appealing to
these groups in an interpersonal manner, rather than through
media, Carvin was able "to position Lambert in the middle 
5of the road." In campaigning face-to-face with black and 
blue-collar voters, Lambert appeared as a populist candi­
date while projecting a conservative image when campaigning 
on television. Since the face-to-face gatherings reached 
small audiences, his attempts to remain a conservative can­
didate to his larger television audience was better insured.
Carvin1s media strategy for projecting Lambert as a 
conservative populist began with his first television ads. 
These initial 30—second biographical ads were aired state­
wide, and "said things about Lambert that he couldn't say
6about himself. " They showed him walking along a road in
Sorento, Louisiana, talking about his plans for the state. A
second biographical ad produced identified Lambert with a
city (Baton Rouge), because "we wanted also to give him an
urban image, not just a country guy who was running for 
7governor."
In these, and the remainder of the ads Carvin produced,
he used a Steadi-Cam, a sophisticated camera capable of
filming constant movement without disrupting the quality of
the film. The Steadi-Cam "involved Lambert in the spot,
8while adding action to the production." The constant move-
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ment of the camera showed him "as a man with vitality, vig-
9or, and activity." Carvin's decision to have Lambert walk­
ing toward the camera began as an experiment, but the tech-
10nique "looked like a good gimmick so we made it ours."
Aged thirty-eight, Lambert was the second youngest can­
didate in the race and his election would have made him the 
youngest governor in the history of the state. Carvin recog­
nized this as a potentially negative characteristic and count­
ered by portraying Lambert as an experienced middle-aged 
candidate. Lambert's conservative wardrobe and silver hair 
aided Carvin in this effort.
Following the introductory biographical ads, Carvin pro­
duced a new set of commercials. The image of Lambert in this 
series was derived from the information received in a poll 
taken by Bowles- and Groves, which revealed that "the people
were vitally interested in energy, inflation, and utility 
11rates." This information impelled Carvin to portray Lam­
bert as "a champion of the consumer and a fighter of higher 
12costs."
Lambert's physical appearance was also altered for the
new series of commercials. He was persuaded to dress in an
attractive two-piece suit, which "made him look like a gov- 
13ernor." This attire seemed to enhance his perceived abil­
ity to communicate and to appear to discuss the various 
topics he addressed with authority.
In attempting to communicate to the electorate Lambert's 
concern for a "cancerous" inflation rate, fueled by rising--
65
■utility and energy costs Carvin's ads "attracted attention
14
for Lambert, and then controversy." These spots showed 
him on Wall Street in New York addressing the issue of the 
high cost of living; at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, 
explaining the dangers of nuclear plants; and in Geneva, 
Switzerland, criticizing the OPEC nations for the high 
price of energy.
Carvin was criticized for these three out-of-state ads, 
primarily because of Lambert's refusal directly to address 
the issues in Louisiana. Also, the public felt that Lambert 
was wasteful in traveling far distances to address issues 
facing Louisianians. Carvin defended the ads by explaining 
the circumstances that led to his decision to produce them.
In March, 1979, prior to the ads’ appearance, Carvin com­
missioned Bowles and Grove to administer a poll of the pub­
lic's opinion of various issues and of Lambert's position in 
the polls compared with that of the other candidates. Results 
of the poll showed Lambert in 4th place, with 12% of the vote; 
Hardy 3rd, with 19%, Fitzmorris with 27%, and Treen, 32%.
The poll also revealed that Lambert's image in the Baton 
Rouge area was highly positive, because of his continual 
challenges of the utility companies while chairman of the 
Public Service Commission. Therefore, Carvin decided that
Lambert's stand against the utility companies was the image
15to be projected to the electorate statewide.
During this period, the Baton Rouge Morning Advocate
ran a series of articles attacking the Public Service Com­
mission. One article, quoting a source from Wall Street,
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claimed that Lambert was not properly representing the con­
sumers of Louisiana. Lambert's reaction to this article - 
informing the electorate that wealthy Wall Street executives 
were against him - fitted the classic populist image that 
the working class hates Wall Street. Carvin felt that the 
most effective commercial for refuting this negative public­
ity was to film the ad at Wall Street.
While preparing to shoot the Wall Street ad, the Three 
Mile Island nuclear mishap occurred. Lambert went before a 
Legislative committee as chairman of the Public Service Com­
mission and declared he would go to Three Mile Island. When 
he announced this plan, Carvin decided to capitalize on 
this, too and two spots were shot on this subject. These 
spots inspired Carvin1s idea to stage the ads in a manner 
similiar to a newsman on locating covering a story.
The third controversial ad, the Geneva spot, moving 
some to think Lambert a financially wasteful and flamboyant 
candidate, was planned because Lambert feared his opponents 
would attack him on the rising cost of utility rates. The 
ad was intended to show that utility rates were not being 
increased by the Public Service Commission, but were the re­
sult of the fuel adjustment clause. Carvin used the approach 
»
that the Arabs were responsible for this increase. In June
1979, OPEC met in Geneva and Carvin decided to film the ad
from that location. His strategy was to employ an "affirma-
16tive defense ... blame others for our problems.
Carvin defended his decision for the Geneva spot by
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claiming the ad "was effective ... a bold and daring thing17
to go outside the country." It appeared, though, that 
the commercial "gave people more to talk about than just 
the issue."
But the production of the three out-of-state adver­
tisements did seem to have damaged Lambert's image. "He 
began to look too showy, he began to show a lack of sub-
19stance to the point of using props more than intellect."
A general assumption of communication theorists is 
that non-verbal communications have meaning within their 
specific context. While some non-verbal communications 
are used as a means of self-expression, others have per­
suasion as their intent. The various commercials produced
throughout Lambert's entire campaign transmitted important
20non-verbal messages to the viewing audience.
Harvard psychologist Robert Rosenthal developed a 
measure of sensitivity to non-verbal communication. His 
research made 200 segments showing an actress portraying 
various emotions in certain contexts. People were so ac­
curate in recognizing the scene and emotion portrayed that 
the experiments cut the exposure length to see at what 
point accuracy diminishes. Even at an exposure of 1/24
of a second, people were correct over two-thirds of the 
21
time. These findings confirmed Edward Sapir's observa­
tion in 1927 that "we respond to gestures with an extreme 
alertness and, one might say, in accordance with an elab­
orate and secret.code that is written nowhere, known by
22none, and understood by all."
The major criticism of the Carvin spots was the 
positioning of Lambert in locations outside of Louisiana. 
When the viewers saw him speaking from Wall Street, from 
Three Mile Island, and from Geneva, it appeared that their 
negative perception of Lambert was the result of where he 
was, rather than what he was saying. The denotation of 
the message was that Lambert was a worldly, sophisticated 
man who was knowledgeable enough to deal with large prob­
lems. However, the connotation of the message was signif­
icantly different than the denotation. The electorate's 
connotation of these three sites was one of elaborate un­
necessary expense and an insensitivity to the concerns of 
occurences in Louisiana. Consequently, the non-verbal 
aspect of the message was overpoweringly negative.
Following this series of ads, Lambert dropped further 
in the polls. Carvin produced a new series, but they were 
not effective enough to erase from the public's minds the 
negative image of Lambert resulting from the others.
PHASE II
As a result of his decline in the polls following the 
Carvin spots, Lambert's supporters demanded a change in 
political consultants. His fourth place ranking had “chief 
supporters screaming that Lambert was slipping and some­
thing had to be done ... and the person out front is the
23
one who creates and he's the one to go quickly." There-
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fore, Carvin was fired as media consultant on September 2, 
1979, and replaced by Robert Squier and Associates, of 
Washington, D. C.
Lambert's campaign strategist re-examined the situa­
tion which found Lambert in the open primary against the 
conservative, Dave Treen, and recognized the difficulty 
of his running against such an arch-conservative Republican. 
The results of a Bowles and Grove poll indicated that Lam­
bert must be more successful if his image were changed from 
a conservative to a populist candidate, an image typical of 
the traditional Louisiana Democrat politician. This re-
i
evaluation resulted in Lambert strategists altering their
24candidate's image midway through the campaign.
Squier had been recommended to Lambert by Louisiana 
Congressman Gillis Long, a Lambert supporter, who cited 
the results of the 1979 Kentucky gubernatorial campaign 
that Squier had recently completed. Squier's candidate 
in that race was John Y. Brown, a politically inexperienced, 
multimillionaire businessman, who announced his candidacy 
nine weeks before the Democratic primary.
While conducting the Brown campaign, Squier used tele­
vision to communicate his message. "His TV spots sidestepped
2 5issues and concentrated on image." For example, a widely 
used two-minute commercial showed Brown and his new wife 
(celebrity Phyllis George) in a coal mine, wearing head­
lamps. "To make clear the new Mrs. Brown was no femme 
fatale (just a down-home cheerleader from Texas), a five-
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minute spot included twenty-two silent seconds of Phyllis
2 6signing autographs. This type of political advertising 
by Squier was followed by Brown's primary victory and event­
ual gubernatorial triumph. The account of Brown's victory 
persuaded Lambert to hire Squier.
Squier's philosophy of political media was the con­
verse of Carvin's. Rather than focusing on artistic di­
mension, Squier placed emphasis on communicating his in­
tended message to the targeted audience without stressing 
the artistic dimension. His political spots reflected the 
findings of the public opinion polls.
In organizing his campaign staff, Squier employed two 
prominent political campaigners from Washington, D. C., 
pollster William Hamilton and organizational specialist 
Matt Reese. Squier's aim was to exploit all available 
resources that enable a candidate to win votes.
Before analyzing the image Squier created for Lambert, 
it is necessary first to examine the sophisticated tech­
niques Matt Reese used in targeting Lambert's constituency. 
The targeting system he employed was called "Claritas," a 
precise technique for pinpointing supporters and opponents
of issues or candidates ... of categorizing citizens by
‘ 27neighborhood groupings, called clusters." Claritas is 
used to discover the commonalities of certain neighborhoods 
as to social class or affluence, race, and ethnicity, age 
and family composition, urbanization and housing style, 
and other lifestyle indicators at a small population level.
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This process results in the identification of forty clusters
which represent most types of American neighborhoods. For
example. Cluster 24 is defined as "young consumers, well-
educated, largely white, reasonable affluent and fairly
2 8well distributed across the nation." The Claritas sys­
tem enabled Reese to locate approximately 28 0 households 
called block groups, and assign each a cluster designation.
"A politician then can target his appeal ... or political
29message to his audience."
Maintaining proper commucation between Hamilton and
Reese was a key factor for the success of the Claritas
system. Hamilton's responsibility was to survey a sample
group of voters in the state and inform Reese what types
of people - rich, young, or religious, for instance - think
of a specific issue or candidate. This allows Reese to
tailor his campaign strategy to appeal to his target groups.
According to Reese, "Polls by themselves are valuable 
31but inadequate." For example, a poll may reveal that 
working-class Catholics do not favorably view a particular 
candidate. But Claritas is able to specify block groups 
which are most likely to contain working-class Catholic 
women, and then further specify which of those working- 
class women favor and which oppose a particular candidate.
An example of the actual operation of Claritas was seen 
in Missouri in 1978 when Reese was hired to defeat the 
right-to-work amendment. Hamilton's poll revealed that 69 
percent of the voters were in favor of right-to-work, while
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30 percent were opposed. "Even among labor union families
32the measure was favored 57 to 35 percent."
Reese's strategy was to spend only 15% of the 2.5 mil­
lion dollar campaign budget on media. Reese's reasoning 
behind this strategy was that commercials could arouse the 
opposition and attract opponents who normally would not
vote. He, therefore, "concentrated on registering citizens
3 3likely to vote his way." In addition, post-cards, tele­
phone calls, and personal visits inundated households iden­
tified by Claritas as the exact target audience. The result 
of this "quiet, directed attack worked -' 60 percent of those 
who voted rejected the amendment." Reese estimates that
"110,000 new voters who registered in Missouri that season
34registered because of labor's efforts."
Reese used targeting to determine which key parishes 
contained the highest concentration of Lambert "persuadables" 
and would accordingly deserve extra effort. Two hundred 
thousand "persuadable" households throughout the state 
were targeted for special telephone, mail and personal 
contact programs.
Claritas was employed by Reese to identify Lambert's 
constituencies which would be targeted - blacks and labor. 
This research indicated that attention should be concen­
trated on "all laborers and blacks, rural and country 
35whites." Upon completion of the research, the entire 
target area was isolated. "So, all Squier had to do was 
plug in that feeling into his TV and not worry about a cer­
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36tain part of society." The research indicated that media 
should concentrate on those areas where people most likely 
to vote for Lambert were located. Those areas identified 
as "upper middle class, conservatives were left alone 
because they would never go for us (Lambert) regardless of 
what we had ... logically, we would find out ’hard' (com­
mitted) people, confirm they were for Lambert, identify 
our soft vote (persuadable) and work on them hard (i.e. by 
use of phone bank, mailings, voter contact programs) and
then work on the undecided, which were a large percentage
37up until the election day, and Treen's soft vote." Once 
the necessary group had been targeted by the use of Clari­
tas, Reese used telephone banks for voter identification 
and recruitment. For example, Lambert's computer person­
nel pulled out phone numbers, addresses, and names of voters 
registered as Democrat, people under 35 years of age, blue- 
collar workers, and citizens with less than two years of 
college. First, the natural constituency was determined 
by this list, and then the main group on which the phone 
banks would concentrate. Then and only then would phone 
calls be made. Interviewers classified the recipient as 
"neutral," "definitely against," "a worker," or "a decided 
that won't work." Next, "the workers" were set up in a 
program involving direct mailing in which they were asked 
to distribute campaign materials. The success of the sys­
tem depends on communication between the phone bank per­
sonnel and the workers to insure that the proper work is
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38being carried out.
A major task for the Lambert telephone workers was 
identifying potential Lambert voters, recruiting volunteers, 
and getting the voter out on election day. Lambert's main 
phone bank, located in Baton Rouge, was manned by 14 0 call­
ers, The phone center operated seven days a week, with the 
days divided into two six-hour shifts. The phone banks 
operated from the last week of September until election 
day, October 28.
Hamilton's research discovered that labor and blacks 
were Lambert's biggest supporters. Therefore, Squier at­
tempted to present Lambert as an appealing candidate to 
his supporters by having him adapt to the particular 
audiences in each commercial. The image Carvin attempted
to create was to depict Lambert as a "fighter for the poor
39and underprivileged.1
His technique for producing political commercials is 
"cinema verite," (truth film), which does not require the 
candidate to read or memorize a script. Rather, the can­
didate is filmed on location, talking extemporaneously in­
to the camera or to a particular group of people. Prom 
the extensive amount of footage collected, Squier then
edits the film into selected political ads "which best
40captures issues, personalities, and images."
Once Hamilton had completed the necessary research, 
his information was presented to Squier, who translated 
it into commercials. As the employment of Squier marked
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the beginning of the second phase of the Lambert campaign, 
the governor1s race simultaneously started taking shape 
as the constituencies began to fall into place. For ex­
ample, during the early stages of the campaign, Treen was 
receiving between 18% to 20% of the black and labor vote, 
due primarily to Treen’s high name-recognition with these 
two groups. "But, by the time Squier came in, the blacks 
and labor were beginning to fall to Lambert - people were
learning about Treen and Fitzmorris and everyone was going
41back to where they belonged."
Squier decided to maintain the campaign materials de­
signed by Carvin. In addition, he used the theme - 'Louis­
iana First, Louis Lambert for Louisiana.' The use of al­
literation tends to make the theme memorable and probably 
therefore, effective. The theme was repeated following 
all commercials. This theme was selected as a result of 
polling conducted by Hamilton which revealed that citizens 
felt Louisiana was not progressing as were other states.
Squier1s series of commercials showed Lambert address­
ing a small group of citizens on a variety of issues, such 
as energy, inflation and unemployment. In each spot, the 
casually dressed Lambert spoke extemporaneously to a small 
gathering of people. His image was that of a concerned 
politician willing to discuss issues with the general pub­
lic and to fight for their particular causes. In the back­
ground of these spots was a small gathering of the audience 
Squier was targeting - laborers, farmers, the elderly, etc.
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In addition to the series of thirty-second ads, Squier 
began frequent attacks on front-runner Treen's voting 
record on social issues. With approximately one month re­
maining until the open primary, Lambert was lodged in fourth 
place, behind Hardy, Fitzmbrris and Treen.
The commercials attacking Treen began with the caption, 
"Why Dave Treen can't be governor of Louisiana," and con­
tinued by attacking his voting record. "The anti-Treen
„4spots are to the point, hardhitting and extremely negative." 
The main objective of this ad series was to add credibility 
to Lambert's image as "the poor man's candidate" and his 
concern with the social issues of the state.
Lambert's campaign director stated that the attack on 
Treen was to eliminate Paul Hardy from the race. Since the 
conservative Treen was in command of first place, there 
was no need to "remind diehards of what a hard-line right­
winger Dave Treen is. Paul Hardy, meanwhile ... is picking
up a lot of conservative support that logically should go 
43to Treen." Therefore, for Lambert to make the runoff, 
he had to surpass Hardy and Fitzmorris.
Lambert's attacks forced Treen to defend his record 
"as a fiscally responsible conservative, trying to hold the 
line in Washington against the wild freespenders like Lam­
bert. Treen's stirring call to arms brings conservatives
44flocking even closer to him." This particular strategy 
seemed to have been successful since Hardy's momentum was 
reduced and Lambert advanced to the second-place position.
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But with all his strategies and effort, it seems 
that Squier was unsuccessful in creating a positive image 
of Lambert. Since the research isolated Lambert's constitu­
ency, Squier’s main responsibility was to aim his commercials 
to this already supportive audience. Instead of showing Lam­
bert as a passive, respectable candidate of labor and blacks, 
he portrayed him as a harsh, loud, rugged candidate. These 
commercials seemed to have unnecessarily angered other seg­
ments of the population, particularly the undecided voters 
who had yet to decide on the candidate they would support. 
"That wasn't the type of guy you wanted to be governor. Those 
advertisements were harmful to Lambert’s image because people
felt he was ’mudslinging ... that Lambert's campaign tactics
45were nauseating and disgusting."
Squier’s usage of negative advertising was not posi­
tively received. Instead of helping Lambert, the ads seemed 
to turn voters away from him. The anti-Treen ads, it ap­
pears, were not appropriate for a gubernatorial campaign. 
Daniel Bailey, a nationally-known political consultant, 
said: "television is a living-room communication vehicle, 
and the subject matter, and the approach, and the emotions 
that are appropriate in the living-room, are appropriate on
the screen. But, if they’re not appropriate in the living-
46room, they’re not appropriate at all.
The initial ads produced by Squier were designed to 
portray Lambert as "the poor people's candidate," actively 
involved and interested in their needs. The non-verbal
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messages in these ads may have affected the audience's 
perception of Lambert. In thirteen of the fifteen ads in 
which Lambert appeared, he was standing within two or three 
feet of from two to fifteen people. Lambert's close posi­
tion to his audience seemed to connote his intimate concern 
for the people. The spatial distance in the ad appeared 
to "give a tone to the communication, accent it, and at 
times even override the spoken word. The flow and shift
of distance between people as they interact with each other
47is part and parcel of the communication process."
Communication theorists have observed that the in­
terpersonal distance of two and one-half to four feet is
used when discussing subjects of personal interest and in- 
48volvement. In thirteen of the fifteen ads in which Lam­
bert appeared, he was involved in the discussion of the 
personal interests of his audience. It has also been 
noted that an individual's voice is associated with specif- 
if ranges of distance. When interacting, the individual's 
voice should be soft and the volume low. In ten of the 
fifteen ads, Lambert's voice seemed hostile and unpleasant. 
This type of vocal projection would have been more appro­
priate had Lambert's audience been standing more than four 
feet away. Prom five feet onward, a full voice is accept­
able. However, by using a full and forceful vocal delivery 
while standing two or three feet from an audience, it seems 
Lambert was perceived as being an angry and harsh candidate. 
Squier's technique of surrounding Lambert with members
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of his target audience appeared effective. In the eighteen 
ads in which this occurred, Lambert seemed to establish di­
rect identification with that group of viewers. These ads 
seemed to have strengthened Louis Lambert's association with 
groups such as the elderly, blacks, and blue-collar workers.
Lambert also adapted to his audience by the clothes 
he wore. In twelve ads, he appeared in a shirt and tie, 
in contrast to the two-piece suits he wore in all of the 
ads in Phase I.
Lambert also used numerous gestures while speaking.
In eleven of thirteen ads in which he appeared, Louis 
Lambert used gestures to emphasize a point while communi­
cating with his audience. Gestures are most effective
when "they are natural and not affected, when they enhance
49and harmonize with the verbal message." He frequently 
attempted in a non-intimate manner obtrusively to shake 
hands with members of his audience. This stilted gesture, 
coupled with poorly timed back-patting, hinted of insin­
cerity on Lambert's part. His message of wishing to be 
close to the people seemed to be ineffectively communicated.
During the week preceding the October 27, 1979, open 
primary, a survey was conducted at Louisiana State Univers­
ity concerning the gubernatorial campaign. A formal ques­
tionnaire was administered by telephone to a random sample 
of Baton Rouge residents to determine the public's opinion 
of the gubernatorial candidates. A section of the study 
focused on the public's perception of the major candidates
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in four areas: qualification, honesty, leadership, and 
50intelligence.
Results of the study indicated that Lambert had a neg­
ative image in the eyes of the public. On a scale of one 
through five, with one being most positively perceived, 
and five being most negatively, Lambert received the lowest 
score, a 2.986 and a 3.233 mean value, on the issues of
honesty and qualifications. The most honest and qualified
51candidates received scores of 2.417 and 1.92 8.
Lambert was also viewed as the candidate with the poor­
est leadership qualities. He received an average value of 
2.986, compared with the high of 1.819. On the issue of in­
telligence, Lambert was viewed by the public as the second
least intelligent candidate, 2.568, compared with the most
52intelligent candidate's average of 1.917.
Although Squier's ads did properly target Lambert's
constituency and did portray him as being similar to them,
they apparently did not enhance his credibility. The image
Squier created did not seem to project a positive image of
Lambert. Lambert's constant shouting, his harsh attacks on
his main opponent, and his outwardly aggressive mannerisms
seemed harmful to his overall image.
The official results of the October 27 open primary
placed Louis Lambert in second place, behind frontrunner 
53Dave Treen. There were various factors which could be 
responsible for Lambert's strong finish. It could have 
been Squier's ads, targeted to a well-defined audience.
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Although Lambert's overall image may have been negative, 
he was perceived in a positive manner by his targeted con­
stituency.
Another factor which probably contributed to Lambert's
second-place finish was the well-organized strategy of Matt
Reese. During the last two months prior to the campaign,
the Reese organization located and trained 1635 different
people in all parts of the state who volunteered their
assistance on "getting the vote out" on election day. In
addition, Reese located and tested 234 volunteers who helped
with various programs in selected parishes and another 411
volunteers who went from door-to-door in special target 
54precincts.
While the Reese organization was being coordinated in
the field, telephone operators in Baton Rouge and New
Orleans were calling throughout the state. This operation
resulted in the recruitment of 10,340 block captains and
Lambert leaders, volunteers who go door-to-door or who
55agree to call selected voters in their neighborhood.
Although Lambert did make the runoff, constant image 
adjustments and a negatively perceived image proved harmful 
throughout the campaign. His second-place finish was des­
cribed by pollster Dan Walker as "an incredible feat, when 
you consider the guy started out with one constituency, 
shed it, and then found another constituency. He campaigned
for eight months as a moderate conservative. Then he pulled
56together a labor-black coalition against. Treen." Lambert's
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second place finish can be attributed to the organizational 
workings of Matt Reese and his "claritas" operation. This 
sophisticated targeting system seemed effective in identi­
fying and persuading Lambert's constituency to vote for 
Lambert during the general primary. The poor image-making 
of Carvin and Squier was offset by the effectiveness of 
Reese's "behind-the-scenes" organization.
Although Lambert finished second in the open primary, 
the offical results were delayed until there was an ex­
tensive re-evaluation of the votes cast on October 28. The 
unofficial tabulations of the vote by the Associated Press 
and United Press International indicated Fitzmorris the 
second place finisher. However, following a recount of 
absentee ballots and a retabulation of the votes, Lambert 
replaced Fitzmorris for the runoff berth.
The confusion over Lambert's and Fitzmorris' final vote 
tabulation was intensified when Fitzmorris filed a suit in 
District Court alleging that Lambert won the runoff position 
through election fraud in the open primary. The subsequent 
trial proved most harmful to Lambert's campaign. First, 
the legal suit prevented Lambert from campaigning and at­
tempting to raise the additional monies required for the 
runoff. Second, his image was tarnished by the suit's 
claim of wrongdoing on Lambert's behalf.
Pollster Bill Hamilton noted the suit damaged Lambert's 
57credibility and that Lambert's behavior during the en­
tire episode further weakened his image. "He acted like a
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dishonest man. He wouldn't talk to reporters, he wouldn't
try to communicate with them. He started to shut them out
58of his campaign, he started to get scared.”
Shortly following final settlement of the suit, Lam­
bert was beset with another political obstacle. The four 
major Democratic gubernatorial candidates, Hardy, Mouton, 
Henry, and Fitzmorris announced their endorsement of the 
Republican candidate, Treen. Their endorsements seemed to 
leave the public with the impression that Lambert was not 
a worthy candidate since four Democrats would not support 
their fellow Democratic candidate.
The endorsements and the Fitzmorris legal suit, coupled 
with an already poor image, placed Lambert in a difficult 
position as he prepared for the December 8 general election. 
From November 14, following the trial, to November 22,
Squier continued to air negative ads which attacked Treen's 
record. Although such ads may have been responsible for 
placing Lambert in the runoff, they were not appropriate 
for the general election campaign. Since the general elec­
tion was only twenty days away, Lambert’s organization was 
forced to move quickly. The political situation demanded 
that there be instantaneous media capability because of 
the new information being received daily. Because of his 
political involvement in campaigns in other states, Squier 
began neglecting the Lambert campaign. This was harmful 
to Lambert's campaign, preventing his being able quickly 
to react to charges or damaging statements made by his
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opponent.
Rather than addressing the new problems which arose, 
such as Lambert's loss of credibility, Squier continued 
to air old commercials showing Lambert speaking to citizens 
and attacking his opponent - reinforcing the negative image 
he received during the open primary.
As a result of his ineffective consulting, Squier was 
discharged, replaced by Gus Weill and Raymond Strother of 
Baton Rouge. With only sixteen days remaining before the 
election, a poll revealed that Lambert had 23% to 24% of 
the vote, compared with Treen's 54%; 32% of the voters 
were undecided.
PHASE III
As preparations were made for the final sixteen days 
of the campaign, significant circumstances were occurring 
behind the scenes. The cast of players for the Lambert 
organization had suddenly changed and the campaign, too, 
changed a third time, with Ray Strother assuming the role 
of media consultant. Lambert's staff changed for two 
reasons: first, Gillis Long became involved in the campaign 
and sent various aides to assist Lambert; and second, Ed­
win Edwards also sent aides to help him. During this time 
a member from both Long's and Edward's staff was traveling 
with Lambert, so as to give each group access to Lambert. 
This constant involvement of Edwards' and Long's staff 
in the campaign seemed to cause confusion rather than
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to help and actually was disrupting the Lambert's organi- 
59zation.
After assuming control of the third phase of Lambert's
campaign, Strother immediately ordered a poll to be taken
by Bill Hamilton "to find out the strengths and weaknesses
of Louis Lambert; where his natural constituency was, what
60the problems were." It was his last-minute effort to 
change the image of Lambert and to solve his greatest 
problem - the lack of credibility.
Strother's poll revealed that blacks and labor were in 
support of Lambert, mainly because they had no other can­
didate they could ideologically support, so the ads were 
targeted to this audience.
The commercials produced by Strother were in direct 
contrast to the spots used by Squier. Strother dressed 
Lambert in attractive, conservative suits and had him 
speaking directly to the people. He attempted to show Lam­
bert as the underdog, the candidate of the poor people.
In one ad, the comparison was made between Lambert and 
Truman, noting that the press and big politicians tried to 
defeat Truman and were now trying to defeat Lambert.
Strother also attempted to give Lambert an Edwin Ed­
wards image. Lambert's appearance was similar to that of 
Edwards - a handsome man with silver hair. He had Lambert 
make complimentary reference to Edwards and Edwards, in 
turn, produced several ads endorsing Lambert. The purpose 
here was to exploit fully the endorsement of the politically
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popular Edwards.
A negative image, however, continued to develop. Lam­
bert's appearance, both to live and TV audiences, seemed to 
change from that of a strong, firm, and independent leader 
to one lacking authority and confidence. His attempts to 
associate himself with Edwards were becoming over exagger­
ated; he seemed to suffer from the comparison with Edwards.
Strother knew that Lambert's black and labor support 
was not enough - that additional votes must be had for 
victory. He began by changing Lambert’s demeanor, "not 
allowing him to be angry, dressing him very well, having 
him sit in front of the camera. He wanted him to look in­
to the lens of the camera because a candidate can gain cred-
61ibility by looking at his constituency.
In new commercials Strother "stripped away all the
trimmings ... because we thought it was coming off a little 
62fake." Lambert's new image was to be that of a passive,
nice man. "We wanted to show the public that Lambert wasn’t
a bad, mean mobster. He's like you, he's not angry, he's
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an attractive man. He looks like a governor."
This description of the candidate seemed to have been 
effectively communicated to electorate in three thirty- 
second ads. They showed Lambert seated in a white chair, 
with a "homey" look provided by a table lamp and a picture. 
Lambert spoke in a low, mild tone - a complete contrast 
to his vocal delivery in the commercials of Phase II - and 
his non-verbal messages were minimal and subtle. Altogether
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the new ads were effective in portraying Lambert as a com­
passionate, honest and genteel candidate.
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CONTENT ANALYSIS OF LAMBERT'S POLITICAL COMMERCIALS
AN ANALYSIS OF THE VERBAL CONTENT
In the communication process, a central position is oc­
cupied by the content. Communication content represents 
the information which one person or group communicates to 
another. Communication content contains such a vast 
quantity of valuable human experience that a single sys­
tem of substantive categories cannot describe it. However, 
a scientific method exists which does describe various 
facets of content in summary form. This method is called 
content analysis - a research technique for the objective,
systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest
1content of communication.
Wright suggests three reasons why it is advisable to
2study systematically the content of communications.
First, despite the high frequency of exposure to media con­
tent, the experience of each individual is limited and se­
lective. Second, these individuals tend to over-generalize 
from their particular communication experiences, thereby 
obtaining a distorted picture of reality. Finally, during 
the everyday exposure to communications content, recipi­




Most discussion of content analysis dealing with the 
purposes, uses, and functions of the technique concern them­
selves with distinguishing between three areas: descriptions 
of the texts of communication, attempts to draw inferences
from the texts as to their antecedents, and attempts to
3draw inferences from the texts as to their effects.
A sophisticated use of content analysis couples it 
with additional information about source, channel, receiver, 
or feedback. It could also include conditions such as at­
titude, personality or demographic characteristics. From 
this, predictions concerning the communication process can 
be made. In this case "content analysis is a tool used 
with other methods of inquiry to link message content with 
other parts of the communicative process." ^
Although the emphasis of content analysis is upon the 
message, concern is given to developing information con­
cerning the sender and receiver of the message. The an­
alysis of content that can develop information regarding the 
initiator and recipient of the message while investigating 
the message is the basic assumption of the technique. Berel- 
son lists three other assumptions of the technique which de­
fine this basic assumption.
Berelson states that content analysis assumes that in­
ferences between intent and content or between content and 
effect can be validly made, or that actual relationships 
can be established. He also argues that content analysis 
assumes that the study of manifest content is meaningful.
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This assumption requires that the same meaning be imparted 
by the message to the communicator, communicatee, and analyst. 
Finally, content analysis assumes that quantitative descrip­
tion of content, such as frequency of occurrence of symbols
5or words, is meaningful.
THE PROBLEM OF VALIDITY
Validity is concerned with how the findings of the 
study relate to some measure of the actual or reality. Berel- 
son notes that content analysis dealing with material which 
is more manifest than latent will be more valid. He further 
states that validity in a content analysis is not usually a 
problem if a careful definition of the categories and altern­
ative selections of indicators is performed. Validity is high 
where agreement exists on the definition of relevant categor- 
ies. Every effort was made to define the list of categories 
for this study by using an established checklist.^
George recognizes that one way to check the accuracy 
of the inferences of content analysis is by an internal 
check on the logic and plausibility of the reasoning.
Another way to check the accuracy of the inferences is by
evaluating the degree of confirmation enjoyed by the gener-
8alizations used in support of the specific inferences.
THE PROBLEM OF RELIABILITY
Reliability is a measure of how the results of a 
content analysis compare with a re-analysis by a second 
analyst or group of analysts, or between a present and sub-
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sequent analysis by the same individual. The disagreement 
among different analysts frequently determines the amount 
of error of particular measurement, and, therefore, con­
stitutes the problem of reality. Moreover, reliability 
is a measure of consistency among analysts or through time. 
Different coders should produce the same results when ap­
plying the same set of categories to the same content. Or, 
a single coder or group of coders should produce the same
results when they apply the same categories to the same
9content at different times.
Reliability is a function of the precision in which 
the rules of content analysis are set up and the ease with 
which the discriminations can be made between types of 
content specified by the rules. When assertions are eval­
uated, there is a need for reliability to be measured. The 
analyst is forced to make subtle distinctions that a meas­
ure of reliability is needed to show whether or not certain
cases are inconsistently coded, thus causing worthless re- 
10suits.
TYPE-TOKEN RATIO AND HUMAN-INTEREST TEST
A series of tests were employed to determine the over­
all effectiveness of the verbal messages Lambert communi­
cated to the electorate. The type-token ratio was used 
to measure the variability in Lambert's working vocabulary,
with the scores based on the number of different words found
11in samples of standard length. This test indicates the
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verbal clarity of the message presented. A human-interest 
test is another method used to determine the clarity of the 
verbal message. This test examines the interest level of 
the message and enables one to judge the speech on a scale 
ranging from dull to interesting to dramatic.
In each phase, Lambert used three different deliveries 
in communicating his policital messages. In Phase I, he 
memorized from a prepared script his message to be deliv­
ered on television. In Phase II, he delivered all messages 
extemporaneously. Finally, Lambert read from a cue card 
the advertisement copy in Phase III.
The two tests employed reveal which of the three meth­
ods of presenting the message was clearest and most effect­
ive. The type-token ratio provided the opportunity to test 
the clarity of Lambert's messages. The ratio for each ad­
vertisement is as follows: Phase I 7.26, Phase II 6.8,
Phase III 7.09. The type-token scale indicates that the 
closer the number is to one, the more elementary and more 
simplified is the message. The scores reveal the three 
messages were relatively equal in terms of degree of clar­
ity, but that their verbal content was not presented in 
the clearest possible manner, considering the audience to 
which the message was geared. Although different methods 
of delivery were employed in each phase, the level of 
their clarity remained consistent.
The human-interest test allows the researcher to de­
termine the interest-level of the message presented.
96
Scores ranging from 0-5 are considered "dull," from 6-30,
12"interesting," and from 31-80, dramatic. Results of 
the human interest test reveals: Phase I, 41.9; Phase II, 
36.7; Phase III, 46.1. Accordingly, the verbal messages 
Lambert communicated could be considered "interesting."
The type of delivery for each phase is significant. Phase 
III ads, in which Lambert read from a cue card, were viewed 
as the most interesting, followed closely by the memorized 
script used in Phase I. His extemporaneous delivery, in 
Phase II, rated the least interesting of the three ads.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE VISUAL CONTENT
In modern day American society the political aspirant 
has abundant opportunity to develop and structure his image, 
especially through the use of television, generally consid­
ered the most powerful communications medium. Consequently, 
the politican must be ever conscious of how the TV viewing 
public is perceiving him - the type of image he projects.
Political television, which allows presentation of 
the image of a politician, in turn, provides the viewer
with visible clues to the politician's character and per- 
13sonality. The influential non-verbal content in a tele­
vised political advertisement is the means frequently used 
for projecting the candidate's image. "When the verbal 
and non-verbal content of television material come into 
conflict with each other, it may be certainly predicted 
that the lasting effects on the viewer are likely to be
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those of the non-verbal elements exclusively, the imagery
of television that stems from the presentation techniques 
14producers use." Dan Nimmo argues that the visual message
has a greater effect on total impressions than the verbal
message. "What the candidate says is less significant than
15how they look. Style, not content, prevails."
The objective elements of political television, such
as camera framing, camera angle, juxtaposition, form part
of the basis along which television advertisement pictures
are perceived. According to research on this topic, the
influence of television is primarily in the picture and
secondarily in the accompanying language. Baggeley and
Duck's experiments confirm the influence of the non-verbal
aspect of political advertisements: "the simple visual
imagery of television production actually dominates its
16verbal content."
The 1979 gubernatorial campaign served as a testing 
ground for examining television's influence in shaping 
the electorate’s perceptions. Public opinion generally 
blamed Lambert's defeat on four Democrats' endorsement of 
a Republican challenger. Others attributed it to the detri­
mental effect of Lambert's court proceedings with challeng­
er James Fitzmorris and still others think the cause was 
the negative image Lambert projected during his campaign.
Those closest to Lambert's actual campaign suggest 
his loss was in great part due to ineffective use of the 
media; that inept media advisors caused him to undergo
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three different image changes during the six month campaign. 
The extent to which Lambert's political television advertise­
ments formed and re-formed his image invites analysis/ 
with attention given the possible subtle influences of 
television that are unique among the media.
The framing of an image or scene by the television 
camera creates a visual field. The elements arranged 
within this defined space, the context or sequencing of 
the visual image, the dynamics of movement within the
frame, and the images all interact to create a meaningful
17visual message for the viewer.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze systematical­
ly the visual content of the televised advertisements of 
Louis Lambert and to determine his portrayal by that medium. 
Previous limited research in visual communication and prin­
ciples of film and television aethetics are used as bases 
for analyzing the visual content.
Using visual recordings of Lambert's advertisements, 
eight categories were set-up to chart the visual content 
of each advertisement. The form devised for the coding in­
cluded the following factors: 1. Camera framing; 2. Sub­
ject movement; 3. Eye contact of speaker with camera; 4.
Eye contact of speaker with audience; 5. Facial expression
of candidate; 6. Facial expression of audience; 7. Verti-
18cal camera angle; 8. Number of shots per advertisement.
Since the data represents the total population of shots 
rather than a sample of the shots, statistical tests were not
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necessary. To verify the reliability of the data, however, 
several tests were conducted by independent coders. In each 
instance, the data measured in seconds, showed discrepancies 
of less than 2.5 seconds. Since the coders were dealing in 
hundreds of seconds, this 2.5 precision can be considered 
insignificant and, thereby, did not contaminate the study.
CAMERA FRAMING
Camera framing can intensify the candidate's visual 
image by directing the viewer's attention to the eventful 
details or by giving the image greater detail. Indeed, 
empirical research gives limited support for this proposi­
tion. Alyward, for example, found that viewers expressed
a more favorable attitude toward the use of certain shots,
19particularly close-ups.
A "shot" is "the interval between two distinct video
transmissions, frame splice to splice, or from cut to cut,
20disolve or wipe." While a television ad is perceived as a
whole, it is composed of various elements. The altering of
these individual elements would, theoretically, have an effect
21upon the perception of the whole presentation.
The camera frame is an isolating device which enables
the director to confer special attention on what otherwise
22might be overlooked in a wider context. Close-up, medium, 
and long shots were those traditionally used in Lambert's ad­
vertisements. Each merits certain emphasis.
The audience is better able to observe the facial ex­
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pressions and subtle nuances when the camera is drawn
closer to the subject. The close-up shot "stimulates an
23empathetic response on the part of the viewer." Gerald
Milierson says that close-up shots emphasize the subject's
strength and importance, while the inclusion of longer
shots tends to cause drops in tension and subject import- 
24ance. Other studies contend that the use of the close- 
up shot has no significant effect upon interest level, re­
gardless of where employed. The use of the long shot re­
sults in a decline in the audience's interest level when- 
25ever employed.
Significant differences in camera framing were observed 
in each phase of Lambert's campaign. In Phase I, eight 
advertisements totaling 278 seconds showing Lambert were 
aired. Lambert was framed in a medium shot (waist to knee) 
227.1 seconds or 27.1% of the time. During only 33.9 
seconds or 12.2% of the time was Lambert framed at his mid­
torso and only 17 seconds or 6.1% of the time was Lambert 
framed in a close-up shot. In Phase II, of the 515 seconds 
of advertisements featuring Lambert, 247.7 seconds or 48.1% 
of the shots were framed at the waist-mid torso, 156 seconds 
or 30.3% of the shots were close-ups, while 52.7 seconds 
or 10.7% were devoted on extreme close-up. During 11.4% 
of the time, Lambert was not shown. Finally, during all 
90 seconds of the Phase III ads in which Lambert appeared, 
the traditional long shot-medium shot-close-up sequence 
prevailed. 65.2 seconds or 72.4% of the advertisement
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relied primarily on the close-up framing.
Carvin's extensive usage of the loose shot in Phase
I seemed effective by allowing appropriate background to
be seen with each political message. The loose shot also
allowed the audience to view Lambert walking because "mo-
26
tion is the strongest appeal to attention."
Squier employed the medium shot predominantly through­
out Phase II. The main purpose of this framing was also 
to show Lambert standing closely with his targeted constit­
uents, namely blue-collar, black, and the needy. Weill 
and Strother relied on the "slow zoom" shot, with a focus 
on the close-up shot. The political messages of the Phase 
III advertisements apparently proved more difficult to 
match to appropriate settings, so these messages were given 
with a background consisting of a lamp and picture.
The persuasive emphasis on the various backgrounds is 
noteworthy. The media consultants' inclusion of specific 
backgrounds in framing the shots must be analyzed. A study
by Baggaley and Duck examined the effects of adding a back-
27
ground to a production. They discovered that, presented 
against a picture background, a speaker was perceived as 
more profound, honest, reliable, and fair than when seen 
against a plain background. They continue that the back­
ground selected for a political advertisement "may conse­
quently exude implications far more extensive than ever
28the producer imagines." Carvin's decision to use the 
Wall Street, Three Mile Island, and Geneva background for
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Lambert's initial campaign messages may have appeared to 
be a unique technique. However, the public's negative 
reaction and vocal disapproval of the advertisements as 
"wasteful" spelled disaster for Phase I. It seems that 
the emphasized background, made obvious by the loose- 
framing and the continual references made during the ad­
vertisement, was responsible for the negative image Lam­
bert projected during the early stage of his campaign.
Squier relied, in Phase II, on reaction shots of the 
audience as the background. However, during 155 of the 
255 seconds, or 60.8% which included a personal background, 
the audience appeared either bored, uninterested, or unim­
pressed with Lambert's message. Studies by Baggeley and 
Duck reveal these negative reaction shots of the audience
could be viewed "as more confusing, more shallow, and more 
29inexpert." Even though background shots are not an es­
sential part of the discourse, they can represent the in­
terest value of the candidates message. Past studies re­
flect the persuasiveness of background shots. The in­
sertion of favorable reactions may substantially increase 
the motivational value of the taped message. The possible
negative influence on the viewer's reaction to a speaker30
may outweigh any benefits to be derived. In Phase II, 
Lambert's message was clear and appropriately aimed toward 
his target audience. However, the negative reactions of 
the audience to Lambert's message seemed to outweigh its 




Directors in television manipulate the visual content 
in an attempt to focus audience attention and elicit par­
ticular responses. A well-documented principle of tele­
vision aesthetics is that the vertical camera placement can
influence the importance or dominance of the photographed 
31individual. Livingston suggests that the camera angle 
may affect the audience’s psychological reaction. "The 
angle of a shot has a marked influence on the audience's 
psychological reaction to the subject matter photographed. 
As demonstrated ... angles shooting upward cause the sub­
ject to appear stronger, more powerful than the audience,
while angles shooting downward give the audience a feeling
32of strength and make the subject appear weaker."
The role of camera angle is also referred to as the
principle of dominance. According to Bretz, if a person
is looking up at an object, the object takes on a greater
importance than the viewer. "We feel we are figuratively
as well as actually 'looking up' to it. Conversely, if
the camera shoots down on someone, he is less important 
33
than we are."
The angle from which a subject is photographed de­
termines much of its meaning. Empirical studies revealed 
that as the camera angle moved from high through medium 
to low, the ratings of the model improved. Furthermore,
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individuals were judged more active or potent if the person
was photographed from a slightly low angle and if the per-
34son engaged in at least a slight amount of activity.
Various camera angles can also influence the audience 
impression of a candidate's credibility. Research findings 
indicate that the high angle shot can raise a televised 
figure's credibility. This does not mean, however, that the 
mere inclusion of a few high angle shots will increase 
credibility.
The designation of each angle is determined on the 
basis of where the camera is placed in relationship to the 
subject. In the three phases of the campaign, virtually 
all shots were judged as being at eye-level, but subtle 
differences in camera angles were difficult to determine. 
Eye-level shots depend on the eye of the beholder. Al­
though not immediately remarkable, the eye-level shot can
35have significant effect over the course of the film. In 
only one 60 second advertisement in Phase II did the di­
rector employ a low angle shot. The decision to employ
eye-level shots placed the audience viewer "on equal footing36
with the subject, implying a sense of parity."
The directors in each phase opted to present Lambert 
as an equal with his targeted audience. This selection of 
camera angle appears effective, considering Lambert's strat­
egy of identification with various audiences. The use of 
a lower angle would have separated Lambert from his public. 
Rather than appearing on the level of his public, Lambert
105
could have been negatively created as one with a sense of 
dominance over his viewers.
SUBJECT PLACEMENT
In his works on television aesthetics, Herbert Zettl
suggests that the placement and movement of objects affects
a viewer's perception of that object. Zettl's concept is
37
called "asymmetry of the screen." There is general
agreement that the right and left sides of a visual field
are perceived differently. Studies by Millerson suggest
that a preference for the right side of the screen results
38from a right-handed cultural bias. The filmmaker will 
often exploit this psychological phenomenon to reinforce 
his idea.
There are those who argue that the left side place­
ment is more effective. Since the eye tends to read a 
picture from left to right, "physical movement in this 
direction seems psychologically natural, whereas movement
from right to left often seems inexplicably tense and un- 
39comfortable." According to Mercedes Gaffron, the ob­
server experiences a picture as if he were facing its left 
side. The viewer will, therefore, subjectively identify 
with the left side and will attach greater importance to 
whatever appears there. He continues: "The audience is
inclined to look to its left first and to identify with 
the character appearing on that side ... the left side is 
considered the stronger. The one farthest left dominates
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the scene.”40
The screen placement of Lambert in Phases I and II 
was particularly noteworthy. in Phase I, Lambert was 
positioned on the right side of the screen 35.7% of the 
time, on the left side 31.6% of the time, and in the cen­
ter of the screen 32.7% of the time. In each placement, 
Lambert was walking from right to left, left to right, or 
center to camera. The directors' choice for photograph­
ing these various movements seem to suggest psychological 
implications. The shots of Lambert starting from the left 
and walking to the right is a natural movement for the 
viewer's eyes. Whereas, the movement from right to left
may be seen "as overcoming stronger resistance; it pushes
41against the current, instead of drifting with it." The 
shots of Lambert walking to the camera, on the other hand, 
seem friendly, inviting. Lambert is attempting to move 
closer and become more open with his audience.
In Phase II, Lambert was positioned on the left side 
of the screen 32.5% of the time, on the right side 37.0% 
of the time, and centered in the middle of the screen 19.1% 
of the time. These various positions also seem to suggest 
similar implications as discussed previously. The more 
natural and, consequently, more effective positioning of 
Lambert were the shots positioning him on the left side of 
the screen.
Finally, in Phase III Lambert was positioned in the 
center of the screen with the camera moving slowing from a
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medium shot to a close-shot. This technique seems to 
position Lambert as being on the same level and as being 
near his audience, once again attempting to project a 
friendly, personal image.
It seems that the positioning of Lambert on the 
left side of the screen and walking toward the right is 
the more effective technique because this "natural move­
ment" of the candidate is more pleasing to the viewer. 
Subsequently, this technique may have a psycologically 
pleasing affect on the viewer. More research, however, 
is needed to better determine the effectiveness of the 
varying techniques.
EYE CONTACT
A candidate's appearance may be amplified or minimized
by his use of eye contact with the camera. A speaker's
eye contact with his audience can serve as a measure of
42his liking of his audience. There are conflicting find­
ings in eye contact research concerning an individual's 
effectiveness when employing direct eye contact with the 
camera.
Since 1960, a variety of studies have supported the
concept that direct eye-contact in television content is
a powerful technique. On the other hand, findings by Bag-
geley and Duck suggest that an audience attaches greater
reliability and expertise to the half-profile image as
43opposed to the front eye-contact image.
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In Phase I, Lambert maintained direct eye contact 
with the camera for 201 seconds or 72.3% of the time. His 
direct eye contact seemed to personalize his message, to 
make him appear to be communicating with the public on a 
one-to-one level.
In Phase II, on the other hand, Lambert maintained 
minimal eye contact with the viewing audience. Rather, he 
concentrated on focusing his message toward those members 
in the advertisement. During Phase II, Lambert maintained 
eye-contact with his immediate audience 85.6% of the time. 
This type of eye-contact seemed sincere' and natural as the 
viewing audience observed Lambert communicating with the 
electorate.
The Phase III advertisements resorted back to the 
direct eye-contact technique. The "talking head" shots again 
projected Lambert as speaking directly to the voting public.
A study by Raban concluded that in the half-profile
condition, significantly higher ratings of the speaker's
reliability and expertise were obtained. On the rating
scales, the half-profile condition drew more favorable
44ratings than the direct-to-camera condition.
Studies also revealed that the disruptive effects of 
speaking to a camera do not give the important feedback 
that is customary in mornal interaction. Baggaley and 
Duck contend that the full face shot actually leads to 
less favorable assessments of the speaker. On the other 
hand, Raban argues that "the directness of the straight
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address to a camera is factual and authoritative, whereas,
a speaker framed in half-profile, talking away from the
45camera is likely to appear less so." Overall, significant­
ly more favorable ratings were obtained in the half-pro­
file condition. The half-profile condition drew more 
favorable ratings than the direct condition, even though
differences between the two approaches were not always
46statistically significant.
In the campaign philosophy of having Lambert communi­
cate directly with the people,- it seems difficult to con­
clude which technique most effectively complimented his 
attempts to project the more positive image with his view­
ing audience. In different situations either technique, 
the direct eye contact or the half-profile, may prove more 
effective in assisting Lambert in projecting a positive 
image. Additional research should further investigate 
the impact of these tactical questions which may enhance 
the candidates televised image.
VOCAL AND FACIAL COES
Lambert's vocal and facial expressions appear to have
influenced the audience's perception of him. Mebrabian’s
experimental research concluded that when the liking of a
source is at issue, the relative impact of discrepant
verbal, vocal and facial cues were as follows: total
liking = 7% verbal liking + 38% vocal liking, + 55% facial 
47liking.
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A speaker communicating via television should trans­
mit warmth, enthusiasm, vitality, poise, confidence and 
directness. These intangibles are frequently received 
through subtle, non-verbal cues and are frequently re­
ceived at the peripheral or subliminal level by the 
48viewer. Many negative intangible qualities seemingly 
were transmitted through Lambert's non-verbal cues.
Lambert's facial expression was viewed as an important 
factor in the way he was perceived by his audience. In­
dependent coders rated Lambert's facial expression as 
either friendly, natural, or angry.
In Phase I, Lambert's facial expression communicated 
calmness and sincere interest during 254 seconds or 91.4% 
of the shot. During 24.0 seconds or 8.6%, he smiled and 
appeared happy. In contrast, Phase II showed Lambert ap­
pearing serious, harsh, or angry during 391 seconds or 
85.7% of the time, as opposed to being shown as a relaxed 
candidate 14.3% of the time. His facial expression por­
trayed him an angry candidate. In Phase III, Lambert's 
facial expression during all 90 seconds was that of calm­
ness and interest.
Lambert's vocal expression parallel his facial ex­
pression. In those ads where Lambert appeared harsh, 
serious, or angry, his vocal qualities seemed to support 
his facial expression. In those where he appeared relaxed, 
calm, and interested, his vocal qualities matched his 
facial expression. Research suggests that the separate
Ill
aspects of a person’s performance may conflict, and his
voice may be the main determinant of favorable reaction to
49him, while his visual appearance was less favorable.
Lambert's vocal cues seemed to distract from his 
message because of his harsh, over-serious and loud vocal 
delivery. His failure to vocalize in a pleasing manner 
prevented his increasing listener interest. Consequently, 
he projected an image that was perceived negatively.
NUMBER OF SHOTS PER AD
Research has dealt with the problem of how often to
change shots in an advertisement. Aylward found that a
dynamic style of editing is superior to a static style in
50terms of information gained. Ellery found that in terms
of interest expressed by the viewer, the program shot with
only a medium close-up was favored over the program which
51used loose-shots, medium-shots, and close-up shots.
Finally, Jaspen found that the less visually diverse
presentations were superior to the presentations containing
52
more shots in terms of information gained. These stud­
ies have determined that a camera using just one shot is 
more effective than the multiple camera technique.
In Phase I, an average of three shots per advertise­
ment was presented. Phase II averaged approximately 3.2 
shots per advertisement and Phase III used just one shot 
per ad. Based on the research conducted, it appears the 
shot selection for Phase III was most effective because the
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viewer was able to focus clearly on the dominant image 
being projected. In contrast, the use of multiple shots 
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The end of Edwin Edwards1 two-term reign as governor 
of Louisiana opened the road for an intense campaign to 
elect his successor. Six well known Louisiana politicians 
and office holders announced their intention to seek 
Louisiana's highest political position.
Louis Lambert's gubernatorial campaign began early 
in 1979. His early announcement was supported with ad­
vanced planning by his campaign staff, including the care­
ful selection of a media consultant. The other candidates 
for the office also enlisted the aid of nationally prom­
inent media advisors. As a result, the Louisiana voters 
were witnessed a massive political campaign conducted pri­
marily via television.
Since 1964, the employment of media consultants for 
political campaigns has proved to be vital to candidates 
success. The consultants' importance has been considered 
equal to that of campaign manager or chief funder.
The media manager must be artist and business­
man all at once. He must be able, to shoot 
films in 30 or 90 seconds, or five minutes, 
that catch the voice that gives his candidate 
nobility, force, regular-fellowship or states­
manship. He must know how to edit this film, 
know where to buy the time slot, and precisely 
what local or network audience he hopes to reach - 
the earnest citizen, common slob or union man.1
Louis Lambert fully appreciated the role of the media
116
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consultants and began his campaign by hiring Jim Carvin 
of New Orleans, Louisiana, successful and widely experi­
enced in his field. Midway through the campaign, however, 
Carvin was dismissed and replaced by another successful 
media consultant, Robert Squier of Washington, D. C.
Near the end of the race, Squier also was discharged and 
replaced by Gus Weill and Raymond Strother of Baton Rouge, 
who completed Lambert's campaign.
Lambert's consultants relied almost exclusively on 
television for communicating their message, and, as it 
developed, projected different images of Lambert to the 
people.- Squier, in addition to using television extensive­
ly, also relied on sophisticated polling and phone banks 
for communicating to the electorate about Lambert.
The work of Lambert's and the other candidates' media 
consultants in the 1979 gubernatorial campaign gave the 
Louisiana electorate vast amounts of information on the 
aspirants for the office. Through the medium of television 
they obtained a detailed picture of each candidate - his 
appearance, mannerisms, gestures, voice quality and artic­
ulateness. . Besides these personal attributes, the voters 
were exposed, via television, to the candidates' knowledge 
of and interest in significant issues affecting the state 
and its people and to make personal estimates of their sin­
cerity, ability and other qualities. On the candidates' 
side, the campaign gave Lambert and the others a channel 
for projecting a positive image that could translate into 
votes.
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According to a poll conducted by Samuel Lubell, the 
overwhelming majority responded that they were more in­
terested in how the televised candidates looked and handled
2themselves, rather than issues. His survey analysis re­
vealed that once viewers found themselves unable to cope 
with the issues, they settled back and judged the candi­
date as in a personality contest. This finding fitted 
the 1979 Louisiana gubernatorial campaign also, for in it 
personalities and images apparently over-rode issues.
Further research by Michael Rothchild, prominent
political communication researcher, lends support to the
authors conclusion. It appeared that Lambert was engaged
in a low involvement capaign. According to Rothchild,
three factors must be present in a low involvement campaign:
the issues are not volatile, one candidate has a substantial
3lead over his opponent, and it is not a national election.
When a candidate, such as Lambert, is engaged in a 
low involvement campaign, there are strategies he can in­
corporate into his campaign. Rothchild's low involvement 
model is applicable to Lambert's situation. Since Lambert 
was in second place in the general primary and since the 
issues were not volatile, he would probably have been more 
effective had he focused on a competitively consistent 
image rather than undergoing numerous image changes. Con­
versely, Treen employed a consistent and repetitive image 
throughout his campaign. Rothchild's research tends to 
imply that Treen's success can be attributed to his main-
119
taining a consistent image. However, Lambert's defeat 
can be blamed, in part, on his inability to establish a 
clear and consistent image.
Image-making appeared to be an influential factor 
in Louis Lambert's pursuit of voter support. During each 
phase of the campaign, the media consultant of the time 
attempted to project a Lambert that would be positively 
perceived by the electorate.
In Phase I of his campaign Jim Carvin portrayed 
Lambert as conservative and flamboyant. Lambert received 
much criticism early in the campaign. A reason for such 
scrutiny was a result of his early announcement to seek 
the office of governor. By beginning his campaign approx­
imately five months earlier than the other five candidates, 
Lambert may have encountered the problem of overexposure. 
Saturation seems to have an educational effect, making 
voters more sophisticated about what they see. According 
to media consultant Raymond Strother, when a candidate 
appears in a political commercial, "people can either like 
you, dislike you, or they can be indifferent. But, if you
start real early, you are giving people more of an oppor-
4tunity to dislike you." Lambert's early start may have 
caused people to formulate opinions of Lambert before they 
could judge him in light of the other candidates. Once 
the remaining candidates announced they were to seek the 
governorship, many voters had either eliminated Lambert or 
formulated a negative image of him.
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Garvin's decision to place Lambert in different parts 
of the country further damaged Lambert's image. Although 
the Three Mile Island, Geneva, and Wall Street commercials 
did focus on timely issues, the setting prompted waves of 
criticism which proved harmful to the campaign.
Carvin's spots did not improve Lambert's fifth place 
standing in the polls and resulted in Carvin's dismissal. 
Robert Squier assumed the role as Lambert's media consul­
tant. Squier joined the Lambert organization in September, 
1979, and enlisted the aid of pollster Bill Hamilton and 
campaign organizer Matt Reese. These three men worked 
together and remained in constant communication prior to 
the production of any shot. Before any commercial was pro­
duced, Hamilton conducted research to determine the target­
ed audience. This advance research seemed the key to Phase 
II. The research indicated that the commercials should 
focus on laborers and blacks. "Those identified as upper- 
middle class were left alone ... we would confirm those
who were for Lambert and work on them hard by use of phone
5banks, mailings, voter contact programs." This type of 
organization seems to have been more influential than the 
advertisements Squier produced.
Since the research isolated Lambert's constituency, 
Squier's main responsibility was to aim his commercials at 
this already supportive audience. Instead of improving 
Lambert's image with his targeted audience and the un­
decided voters, Squier showed Lambert as a harsh, angry,
121
rugged candidate. In addition to creating a negative 
image of Lambert, Squier also angered segments of the 
electorate with his commercials.
Although Lambert did make the runoff, the image Squier 
created for Lambert was not the main reason for the second 
place finish. Rather, it seemed that the "behind the 
scenes" work of Reese and Hamilton provided the margin of 
victory. Lambert's angry messages and attack on Treen's 
record tarnished his overall image. Lambert alienated and 
offended voters who would remember his negative image during 
the runoff.
With only sixteen days until the runoff election,
Squier was fired and replaced by Raymond Strother. The
commercials produced by Strother contrasted with the Phase
I and Phase II commercials. Strother attempted to show
Lambert as the underdog, the candidate of the poor. He
attempted to change Lambert's image by not allowing him to
be angry. "We wanted to show the public that Lambert wasn't
a bad, mean monster. He's like you; he's not angry, he's
6an attractive man. He looks like a governor."
Strother also associated the Democratic candidate with 
outgoing governor Edwin Edwards. However, continued at­
tempts to make this association seemed to harm Lambert's 
image because they suggested he was lacking leadership. 
Lambert's repeated references to Edwards implied that he 
was not independent but rather a model of Edwards. This con­
tinued association with Edwards may have tarnished the com-
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petent image Strother strove to create.
In conclusion, image-making appeared to be an influ­
ential factor in Lambert's pursuit of voter support. The 
image Lambert projected through his televised political ad­
vertisements did not strengthen his candidacy. The image 
Lambert communicated was not a positive factor in his cam­
paign. His negative image, however, was an important factor 
which served to weaken his candidacy. Had Lambert conducted 
a positive image-making campaign, he may have been more 
successful in his quest for the governorship of Louisiana.
Image-making is important in a political campaign. 
Image-making alone, however, does not win campaigns. Rath­
er, a campaign also needs good organization and the proper 
campaign strategy. In Lambert's case, his organization ap­
peared unsettled throughout the campaign. There were fre­
quent organizational shake-ups and re-evaluated strategies. 
Such campaign confusion seemed to harm Lambert's candidacy 
because his organization frequently changed its intended 
course of action.
Lambert's campaign, however, did make effective use 
of phone banks. This sophisticated campaign technique 
seems responsible for Lambert's strong voter support in 
the two primaries. The phone banks seemed successful in 
targeting voters and persuading those to vote on election 
day.
Lambert's black and labor support can also be a 
reason for his strong finish. The impact of the bloc
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vote is still undetermined. However, it is the view of 
this writer that the labor and black vote is powerful in 
the selection of public leaders.
The total effect of political commercials is still 
unknown. Television political advertising's effect on 
voting behavior has produced no concrete conclusions as 
to whether it may increase the vote or have no effect what­
ever on the electorate. New research is needed to deter­
mine the influence of political advertisements on voters. 
With various communication media (i.e. radio, newspaper, 
direct mail) working in conjunction with television, it 
is difficult to assess the complete impact of television 
political advertisements on the electorate.
Further research is also needed in the area of tele­
vision aesthetics in political advertisements. Conflicting 
and limited research contend that certain camera techniques 
are more effective than others. With politicians' heavy 
dependence upon television in campaigning, a better under­
standing of the effectiveness of various television tech­
niques is mandatory. A certain camera technique may have 
subtle psychological influences unknown to media consul­
tants. These psychological influences of television 
whether positively or negatively affecting a political 
advertisement, need further examination.
Finally, additional research should investigate the 
influence of news reporting regarding the political can­
didate. The news accounts could alter a candidate's image.
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Also, future research should examine the effectiveness of 
the targeting of commercials to insure that each commercial 
is reaching the intended audience.
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